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WHAT ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CAN TEACH 
THE TRADEMARK SYSTEM
†
 
MELISSA F. WASSERMAN
 
ABSTRACT 
In 2014, the Patent and Trademark Office (“Trademark Office” or 
“Agency”) made national headlines when it cancelled the Washington 
Redskins’ trademark registration. The Washington Redskins, a National 
Football League team, is valued at a staggering 2.4 billion dollars, of 
which a substantial portion of this value is attributed to the Washington 
Redskins brand. Whether the Trademark Office’s cancellation of the mark 
REDSKINS will be upheld in federal court will depend intimately upon the 
application of administrative law to the Agency’s decision. Yet the 
trademark community has tended to pay little attention to administrative 
jurisprudence and concomitantly the proper standard of review that 
should be afforded the Trademark Office’s actions. This Article begins to 
rectify this deficiency by starting to explore, in a comprehensive manner, 
the intersection of trademark and administrative law. 
In doing so, it makes two primary contributions. First, this Article 
argues that the deference jurisprudence of the US Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, which hears the majority of Trademark Office appeals, is 
wrong as a matter of doctrine. More specifically, it contends that the 
Federal Circuit fails to afford the Agency sufficient deference with respect 
to both the Trademark Office’s legal and factual determinations. Second, 
this Article posits that the proper application of administrative law 
principles to the Trademark Office’s decisions results in a normatively 
desirable outcome. Affording the Trademark Office’s decisions more 
deference, and hence elevating the role of the Agency in trademark 
disputes, ushers the trademark system into the modern administrative era, 
which has long recognized the deficiencies associated with judge-driven 
policy.  
 
 
 † The title is adapted from Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? 
What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269 (2007).  
   Professor of Law; University of Texas School of Law, J.D., Ph.D. I would like to thank 
Barton Beebe, Jack Beermann, Michael Burstein, Michael Frakes, Paul Heald, Laura Heymann, 
Kristin Hickman, Jake Linford, Jud Mathews, Mark McKenna, Arti Rai, Alexandra Roberts, Rebecca 
Tushnet, Saurabh Vishnubhakat, and the participants of the Administrative Law Conference and the 
15th Annual Intellectual Property Scholars Conference. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Washington Redskins, a National Football League (“NFL”) team, 
is valued at a staggering 2.4 billion dollars, making the franchise the third 
most lucrative in the NFL.
1
 A substantial portion of this value is attributed 
 
 
 1. Mike Ozanian, The NFL’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2014, 10:01 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2014/08/20/the-nfls-most-valuable-teams/. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/7
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to the Washington Redskins brand, which the franchise has sought to 
protect by federal registration of the REDSKINS trademark.
2
 In 2014, the 
Patent and Trademark Office (“Agency”; “Trademark Office,” when 
referring to the Agency’s trademark side; or “Patent Office,” when 
referring to the Agency’s patent side) made national headlines when it 
cancelled the Washington Redskins’ trademark registration.3 In denying 
federal registration to the term REDSKINS, the Trademark Office held 
that the term was disparaging to a substantial composite of Native 
Americans during the time the registration was sought.
4
 The Washington 
Redskins franchise immediately appealed the Agency’s decision.5  
Whether the Trademark Office’s cancellation of the mark REDSKINS 
registration will be upheld in federal court will likely depend intimately 
upon the application of administrative law to the Agency’s decision,6 at 
least to the extent the Trademark Act’s ban on registering disparaging 
marks is constitutional.
7
 Yet the trademark community has tended to pay 
little attention to administrative jurisprudence and concomitantly the 
proper standards of review that should be afforded the Trademark Office’s 
 
 
 2. See id. 
 3. Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014); see also Ken 
Belson & Edward Wyatt, Redskins Lose on Trademarks, but Fight Isn’t Over, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 
2014, at B12; Jacob Gershman, Ashby Jones & Kevin Clark, Redskins Lose at Name Game, WALL ST. 
J., June 19, 2014, at A1; Theresa Vargas, U.S. Patent Office Cancels Redskins Trademark 
Registration, Says Name Is Disparaging, WASH. POST (June 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/local/us-patent-office-cancels-redskins-trademark-registration-says-name-is-disparaging/2014/06/ 
18/e7737bb8-f6ee-11e3-8aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html.  
 4. The decision actually cancelled six REDSKINS registrations associated with football 
services that were filed from 1967 to 1990. Blackhorse, 111 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1083. To the extent the case 
is decided on First Amendment grounds, the standard of review afforded to the Trademark Office’s 
decision will be less salient.  
 5. Complaint, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 62 F. Supp. 3d (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-
1043-GBL-IDD).  
 6. Paul R. Michel, Advocacy in the Federal Circuit, C961 ALI-ABA *5, *8 (1994) (“One of my 
main messages to you is that standards of review influence dispositions in the Federal Circuit far more 
than many advocates realize.”). It should be noted that the Washington Redskins franchise chose to 
appeal the Trademark Office’s decision to a federal district court rather than directly to the Federal 
Circuit.  
 7. Of course, to the extent the case is decided on First Amendment grounds, the standard of 
review afforded to the Trademark Office’s decision will be less significant. Agencies receive no 
deference when interpreting statutes they do not administer, such as the Constitution. See infra note 95 
and accompanying text.  
 The First Amendment issue has become more pressing as the case has progressed. Recently, the 
US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which bars 
registration of marks that “disparage” a group of persons, unconstitutionally infringes free speech. In 
re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). To the extent the Federal Circuit’s decision is 
upheld by the Supreme Court, or followed by other circuits, the deference owed the Trademark Trial 
and Appeal Board’s cancellation of six REDSKINS registrations is moot.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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actions.
8
 The lack of serious substantive engagement of trademark law 
with administrative law is surprising, given that Supreme Court 
intervention in 1999 made clear that standard administrative law norms—
including the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)9—applied to the 
Patent and Trademark Office.
10
 This Article begins to rectify this 
deficiency by starting to explore, in a comprehensive manner, the 
intersection of trademark and administrative law.
11
 With respect to the 
judicial side of this intersection, this Article examines all federal courts 
but primarily focuses on the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“Federal Circuit”), as this appellate court hears the majority of appeals of 
Trademark Office decisions.
12
  
This Article makes two primary contributions. First, it argues that the 
Federal Circuit’s deference jurisprudence with respect to the Trademark 
Office’s decisions is wrong as a matter of doctrine. More specifically, it 
contends that the Federal Circuit fails to afford the Trademark Office 
sufficient deference with respect to both the Agency’s legal and factual 
determinations.
13
 Second, this Article posits that the proper application of 
administrative law principles to the Trademark Office’s decisions results 
in a normatively desirable outcome.
14
 Affording the Trademark Office’s 
decisions more deference, and hence elevating the role of the Agency in 
trademark disputes, ushers the trademark system into the modern 
administrative era, which has long recognized the deficiencies associated 
with judge-driven policy.
15
 That is, it sets the institutional foundation for 
 
 
 8. Only a handful of commentators have explored these issues. See, e.g., Theodore H. Davis, Jr., 
Deference to United States Patent and Trademark Office Determinations by Federal District Courts 
and the Regional Circuit Courts of Appeals, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1997); Jonathan S. Digby, Note, 
What’s the Deference?: Should Dicksinson v. Zurko Apply in the Trademark Context?, 15 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 173 (2007); Hope Hamilton, Note, Parsing the Standard of Review Puzzle: How Much 
Deference Should Federal District Courts Afford Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Decisions?, 12 
FED. CIR. B.J. 489 (2003); Richard L. Kirkpatrick, Likelihood of Confusion Issues: The Federal 
Circuit’s Standard of Review, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1221 (1991).  
 9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2012). 
 10. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s application 
of pre-APA standards to its review of the Trademark Office’s fact-finding).  
 11. Such an account necessarily focuses on trademark validity rather than defenses to trademark 
infringement, which are more specific to trademark infringement lawsuits in federal courts.  
 12. There are two avenues by which to challenge the rights associated with a trademark. The first 
is through administrative proceedings before the Trademark Office, which can be appealed to federal 
court. The second is through infringement actions filed directly in federal court. This Article examines 
only the former.  
 13. See infra Part II.  
 14. See infra Part III. 
 15. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 723, 772 (2004) 
(lamenting that trademark law has evolved on the basis of “personal intuition and subjective, 
internalized stereotypes,” not on “specific and persuasive evidence about consumer behavior”); Cass 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/7
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infusing evidence-driven policymaking into the trademark system, 
enabling the tailoring of trademark standards to advance the system’s 
primary goal: decreasing consumer search costs while not overly 
restricting competition in the marketplace. 
The literature’s failure to conduct a systematic analysis of the 
application of administrative law to the Trademark Office’s actions is 
surprising because the stakes are high. Trademarks are the most widely 
utilized form of intellectual property.
16
 Businesses in almost every sector 
of the economy rely upon trademarks to protect their brands.
17
 Although 
denying federal registration of a mark will not force an organization to 
stop using the mark or divest a mark from its common law protections, it 
will almost certainly result in negative legal and financial repercussions to 
the organization, both in the United States and abroad.
18
 Moreover, there 
are several reasons to believe that the import of federal registration will 
continue to increase in the future; making the question of what standards 
of review should govern the Trademark Office’s determinations all the 
more salient. For instance, the Supreme Court recently made clear that the 
Trademark Office’s decision to uphold or deny federal registration of a 
mark could have preclusive effect on a later infringement action involving 
the same mark.
19
 In addition, several court opinions have suggested that 
denying federal registration to a mark forecloses the possibility of 
pursuing a federal unfair competition claim under the Lanham Act— 
meaning only state law protection would remain.
20
 To the extent that the 
Trademark Office holds certain advantages in crafting the substantive 
standards of trademark law to reflect the trademark system’s normative 
goals, the standards of deference applied to the Trademark Office’s 
 
 
R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079 (1990) (“For the 
twentieth century reformers, courts lacked the flexibility, powers of coordination, initiative, 
democratic accountability, and expertise necessary to deal with complex social problems.”).  
 16. See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 2013 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REPORT: 
BRANDS—REPUTATION AND IMAGE IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 87 (2013).  
 17. Id. 
 18. For instance, the cancellation of a mark will dilute the legal protection it receives against 
infringement, hinder the organization’s ability to block counterfeit merchandise from entering the 
country, and preclude the possibility of treble damages and criminal penalties for counterfeiting. See 
15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2012) (forbidding any authorized goods bearing a registered trademark entrance 
into the country). At least one commentator has suggested that the Trademark Office’s ruling against 
the Washington Redskins is at least partially responsible for the thirty-five percent drop in sales of 
Washington Redskins’ merchandise this past year. Chris Isidore, Redskins Gear Stiff-armed by Fans, 
CNN MONEY (Sept. 4, 2014, 3:57 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/04/news/companies/redskins-
merchandise/. 
 19. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
 20. See infra note 29. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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decisions have significant ramifications for the marketplace and for the 
evolution of trademark law and policy.  
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part I introduces 
the goals of trademark law, the administrative process associated with 
trademark registration, and the manner in which determinations of 
registration by the Trademark Office seek to implement those goals. Part 
II analyzes how existing administrative law jurisprudence applies to the 
Trademark Office’s decision-making. It concludes that the Federal 
Circuit’s deference doctrine is legally incorrect. More specifically, it 
contends the Federal Circuit fails to afford both the Trademark Office’s 
factual and legal determinations sufficient deference. Part III examines 
some implications of elevating the role of the Trademark Office in the 
trademark system. Part IV turns to normative considerations, addressing 
what form of judicial review of the Trademark Office’s decisions would 
be attractive. This Part maintains that the Trademark Office has a 
comparative institutional advantage over the Federal Circuit and further 
argues that the Federal Circuit does not emerge as a clear winner with 
respect to the comparative risk of interest group influence. Consequently, 
Part IV concludes that this shift in power dynamics between the 
Trademark Office and the judiciary that results from the proper application 
of administrative law jurisprudence to the Trademark Office’s decision-
making is normatively desirable.  
I. USING TRADEMARK REGISTRATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE GOALS OF 
TRADEMARK LAW 
In this Part, I present a brief summary of the primary normative goal of 
trademark law, the manner in which the inquiry into trademark registration 
fosters this goal, and the administrative process associated with federal 
trademark registration.  
A. The Primary Goal of Trademark Law 
According to the dominant view, the primary normative goal of 
trademark law is to reduce the costs to a consumer of searching for goods 
that satisfy her preferences without overly restricting marketplace 
competition.
21
 This theory posits that by acting as a repository of 
 
 
 21. The vast majority of scholars use the rhetoric of search costs to describe the normative goals 
of trademark law. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 167 (2003) (summarizing consumer search costs literature); Stacey 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/7
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information about the source and quality of products, marks diminish 
consumer deception and confusion while concomitantly decreasing unfair 
competition to producers.
22
 For instance, trademark protection enables 
consumers who are shopping for a new computer to rely on the presence 
of the APPLE mark as an indicator of the quality of the computer to which 
that mark is affixed. Consumers who previously had a good experience 
with APPLE computers can simply look for the APPLE mark the next 
time they go computer shopping. First-time customers can rely on the 
APPLE mark as shorthand for information they have learned from 
advertising or by word of mouth. Because trademark law “helps assure a 
producer that it (and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, 
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product,”23 the 
producer of APPLE computers has an incentive to produce goods of a 
consistent quality.
24
  
 
 
L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 
TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1223 (2007) (noting that scholars and courts generally endorse the search 
costs theory of trademark law); Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of 
Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 67, 75 (2012) (stating that an “overwhelming majority of scholars use 
search costs language to describe trademark law’s purposes”). Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence recognized that trademark law’s core theoretical justification is to reduce consumer 
search costs. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (citation omitted) 
(quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 2.01[2], at 2–3 (3d ed. 1994)) (“[T]rademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-
identifying mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ for it 
quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this mark—is made by 
the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.”).  
 Although the dominant theoretical account of trademark law is rooted in economics, scholars have 
posited other justifications for trademark protection. For instance, Barton Beebe has argued a 
“semiotic” account of trademark law that considers consumers’ demand for “signs, distinctions, [and] 
differences.” Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 704 
(2004). Robert Bone has argued that moral arguments such as intentional deception should be treated 
differently than economic concerns. Robert G. Bone, Taking the Confusion out of “Likelihood of 
Confusion”: Toward a More Sensible Approach to Trademark Infringement, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 
1307, 1350–53 (2012). Others have argued that additional values, such as the First Amendment, 
should play a larger role in the development of trademark jurisprudence. See Lisa P. Ramsey, 
Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381 (2008) (arguing that 
trademark law should be subject to more First Amendment scrutiny than it currently is); Rebecca 
Tushnet, Trademark Law as Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 737, 756 (2007) (noting 
that while she is “largely in favor of core trademark infringement doctrine as it stands now,” the author 
nevertheless believes that trademark law should be treated more consistently with other commercial 
speech for First Amendment purposes).  
 22. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. 
& ECON. 265, 268–70 (1987).  
 23. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164.  
 24. See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2108 
(2004) (“[I]f consumers lacked the ability to distinguish one brand from another, firms would have no 
reason to create brands with more costly but higher quality characteristics.”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Importantly, trademark law seeks to balance reducing consumer search 
costs against overly restricting market competition.
25
 That is, while 
trademark law aims to prevent third parties from unfairly profiting by 
trading on the reputation of the sellers of the originally desired goods, it 
does not give trademark holders absolute control over the uses of their 
marks. Doing so could result in the economic efficiency gains associated 
with trademarks being outweighed by the negative effect trademarks have 
on marketplace competition. If this occurs, trademarks may no longer 
remain socially useful tools.  
B. The Inquiry into Trademark Registration 
Trademarks are governed by both state and federal law. However, the 
Lanham Act, the source of federal trademark law, now nearly dominates 
the legal landscape.
26
 The US trademark system is often referred to as a 
“use-based” in contrast to a “registration-based” system.27 The exclusive 
rights associated with a mark that otherwise qualify for protection are 
typically acquired by use of the mark in commerce.
28
 Federal registration 
of a mark with the Trademark Office is not required for a trademark to 
become protected.
29
 Moreover, the Lanham Act does not protect a 
 
 
 25. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the 
Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 788–99 (2004) (discussing how trademark law seeks to reduce 
consumer search costs without overly restricting marketplace competition).  
 26. See, e.g., Dolores K. Hanna et al., The United States Trademark Association Trademark 
Review Commission Report and Recommendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 
TRADEMARK REP. 375, 377 (1987) (“Federal trademark registration, Section 43(a), and the engulfing 
sweep of interstate commerce have given the law and policy of trademarks a strongly federal cast. The 
federal courts now decide, under federal law, all but a few trademark disputes. State trademark law and 
state courts are less influential than ever.”); Lee Ann W. Lockridge, Abolishing State Trademark 
Registrations, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 597, 604–05 (2011) (summarizing the dominance of 
federal law in the shaping of trademark rights).  
 For a persuasive argument that state law has played less of a role in the development of trademark 
law than generally believed, see Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 288 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2015).  
 27. Registration-based trademark systems are more common than use-based systems. See, e.g., 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) Domain Name System, 21 
U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 495, 496 (2000) (“[F]or over a century the United States has steadfastly 
resisted adoption of a registration-based system of trademark priority and has adhered instead to a use-
based philosophy.”).  
 28. United States v. Steffens (Trademark Cases), 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Sengoku Works Ltd. v. 
RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996) (“To acquire ownership of a trademark it is not 
enough to have invented the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party claiming ownership 
must have been the first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or services.”).  
 29. In fact, there is some disagreement as to whether a mark that is denied federal registration 
can be enforced as an unregistered mark under § 43(a), the unfair competition claim of the Lanham 
Act. Recently, a district court decision held that marks barred from registration could not be enforced 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/7
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trademark registrant’s exclusive rights in its mark if she is no longer using 
the mark in commerce and cannot prove an impending intent to do so.
30
 As 
a result, registration of a mark with the Trademark Office is 
conventionally thought of as merely recording the existence of a right that 
had been externally created.
31
  
Nevertheless, even in the American use-based system, federal 
registration of a mark substantially enhances the rights of trademark 
owners established by mere “common law” use by conferring a number of 
important legal rights and benefits on the registering party.
32
 For instance, 
registration provides prima facie evidence of the validity of the mark, the 
registrant’s ownership of the mark, and the registrant’s exclusive right to 
use the mark in commerce in the United States in connection with the 
goods and services listed in the certificate.
33
 It also provides the trademark 
registrant with a “right of priority, nationwide in effect,” against anyone 
else in the nation who uses the registered mark after the date of 
application.
34
 Moreover, once a mark has been registered for five years, it 
can become “incontestable,” which limits the grounds upon which the 
mark’s validity may be challenged.35 Federal registration enables a 
markholder to sue in federal courts to enforce her trademark
36
 and possibly 
recover treble damages upon a showing of willful infringement.
37
 Another 
significant advantage that flows from federal registration is the ability to 
obtain the assistance of US Customs and Border Protection in restricting 
 
 
under § 43(a). See Renna v. Cnty. of Union, N.J., 88 F. Supp. 3d 310 (D.N.J. 2014). And at least one 
Federal Circuit judge has also taken this position. See In re Tam, 785 F.3d 567, 576 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Moore, J., concurring) (“Equally clear, however, is that § 43(a) protection is only available for 
unregistered trademarks that could have qualified for federal registration.”). Nevertheless, several 
trademark scholars suggest otherwise. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Implications of Blackhorse v. 
Pro-Football, Inc., PATENTLY-O (June 19, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/N6LY-QZCR.  
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(d) (2012) (requiring an applicant to submit a statement that the mark is 
being used in commerce); id. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be ‘abandoned’ if . . . its use has 
been discontinued with intent not to resume such use.”).  
 31. See, e.g., Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 372 (1st Cir. 1980) (“[F]ederal 
registration . . . does not create the underlying right in a trademark. That right, which accrues from the 
use of a particular name or symbol, is essentially a common law property right . . . .”); Landes & 
Posner, supra note 22, at 282 (“Registration under the Lanham Act does not confer a property right 
without use . . . .”).  
 32. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015) (“The Lanham Act 
confers ‘important legal rights and benefits’ on trademark owners who register their marks.”). 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2012).  
 34. Id. § 1057(c). 
 35. Id. § 1115(b)(5)–(6). This advantage is especially important for “descriptive” marks, as an 
incontestable mark can no longer be challenged for lacking “secondary meaning” as designation of 
source.  
 36. Id. § 1121.  
 37. Id. § 1117.  
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importation of infringing or counterfeit goods, which substantially 
enhances a markholder’s ability to block infringing merchandise from 
entering the country.
38
 These benefits are so significant that it is 
commonplace for owners seeking protection of trademark rights to file for 
federal registration.
39
  
To obtain federal registration of a trademark on the principal register, 
the mark’s owner must file an application with the Trademark Office and 
persuade the Agency that her trademark meets the registration 
requirements.
40
 The name “registration,” however, is something of a 
misnomer as the proceedings before the Trademark Office more closely 
resemble a substantive examination than a perfunctory registration 
system.
41
 The Trademark Office may reject a registration on any number 
of procedural and substantive grounds, the latter of which incorporate the 
basic doctrinal principles that govern the validity of a trademark.
42
 Many 
of these substantive grounds or doctrinal considerations can be seen as 
effectuating the primary normative goal of trademark law: enabling the 
public to easily identify a particular product from a particular source 
without unduly restricting orderly competition—competition whereby one 
firm does not inappropriately take advantage of another firm’s brand.  
For instance, while marks can include anything to which a consumer 
may attach significance or meaning—such as any letter, product design, or 
even a color or scent
43—the rules that limit what can serve as a trademark 
 
 
 38. See id. § 1124; 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (2012).  
 39. Lockridge, supra note 26, at 605 (noting that “federal registration [is] indispensable for any 
owner making an informed decision about its trademark rights”). Registration is far more common for 
words marks than for trade dress.  
 40.  The Lanham Act establishes two separate registers, principal and supplemental, for federal 
trademark registrations. Trademarks and service marks that identify the goods or services of one 
manufacturer and distinguish them from another—that is, are distinctive—are eligible for registration 
on the principal register. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072 (2012). In contrast, designations that do not perform 
this function but are instead merely descriptive, deceptively misdescriptive, primarily geographically 
descriptive, or product configurations that lack acquired distinctiveness, among other things, may be 
registered on the supplemental register. Id. §§ 1091–1096. The principal register registrations enjoy a 
number of substantive and procedural advantages that do not accrue to the supplemental register 
registrations.    
 41. GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 305 
(2d ed. 2007) (noting that the “U.S. ‘registration’ system is closer conceptually in character to an 
examination system”).  
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (a)–(f) (2012).  
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 provides:  
The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in 
commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to 
identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those 
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are almost entirely based upon the informational potential of a symbol, 
and hence the potential of the mark to overly restrict marketplace 
competition. The requirement of distinctiveness—the ability of a mark to 
identify the source of goods or services and distinguish those products 
from others in the marketplace—is rooted in the idea that there are some 
symbols that consumers will realize are source-identifying and some that 
are not.
44
 Marks that are “fanciful”—comprised of coined terms—
automatically meet the distinctiveness requirement. Granting trademarks 
to coined terms also does not unduly restrict marketplace competition, as 
competitors should not be severely disadvantaged from losing the ability 
to describe their products by coined terms. In contrast, marks that are 
merely descriptive—that describe some characteristic of the product—
must have “secondary meaning,” evidence that the public associates the 
word with the product to be registered.
45
 Because consumers presumably 
are less likely to identify descriptive words as source-identifiers, these 
marks could potentially fail to decrease the search costs of consumers. 
Additionally, requiring secondary meaning before a descriptive word can 
be registered helps guard against overly inhibiting marketplace 
competition by unnecessarily limiting a competitor’s ability to 
characterize their product. Similarly, it is not possible to use generic 
signs—terms that identify the class of products (e.g., aspirin or yo-yo)—as 
trademarks because these terms provide no specific information-conveying 
effect and would also overly restrict competition in the marketplace.
46
 That 
is, allowing a party to claim rights in a term “that refers, or has come to be 
understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a 
species”47 would inhibit the ability of competitors to explain what they are 
selling without providing a sufficient reduction in consumer search costs, 
as consumers may be misled if what they believe is a generic term is in 
fact sold by only one company.  
In addition to the distinctiveness requirement, many of the other 
trademark validity doctrines reflect these guiding principles. For instance, 
 
 
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is 
unknown.  
Id. § 1127; see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (finding that the 
Lanham Act does not prohibit the use of color alone as a trademark).  
 44. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “trademark” and “service mark” as words or designs used “to 
identify and distinguish” goods or services). 
 45. Id. § 1052(e)(1) (refusing the registration of a mark that is “merely descriptive” unless the 
applicant proves some level of acquired distinctiveness).  
 46. Id.; see also Dogan & Lemley, supra note 25, at 793.  
 47. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d. Cir. 1976).  
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no mark can be registered if it is likely to confuse consumers about the 
source of that mark’s goods or services, as this kind of confusion 
undermines the informational efficiencies gained by using trademarks in 
the first place.
48
 Similarly, the ability to cancel or oppose the registration 
of a mark that dilutes a famous mark also reflects a balance between 
reducing consumer search costs and overly restricting marketplace 
competition.
49
 The doctrine of dilution seeks to ban the registration of 
marks that “blur” a unique mark but only to the extent such “blurring” 
results in increasing consumer search costs.
50
 That is, dilution law permits 
uses such as commentary and comparative advertising that actually 
facilitate consumer search while concomitantly allowing for robust 
competition in the marketplace.
51
  
Undoubtedly, the registration system also serves others functions that 
are distinct from, but may be complementary to, the primary goal 
underlying the protection of trademarks.
52
 For instance, from a 
markholder’s perspective, federal registration provides the benefit of 
greater certainty as registered marks can become incontestable, are 
presumed to be valid, and are afforded nationwide priority.
53
 Alternatively, 
from a public perspective, the trademark registration system reduces 
“business clearance costs by enabling those engaged in trade to discover 
quickly and cheaply which signs third parties have already claimed.”54 
Businesses who are considering multiple new names may be able to 
decrease their search costs by eliminating at least some possibilities after 
reviewing the register. Nevertheless, the Agency’s application of the core 
substantive validity standards during a registration determination arguably 
aligns more closely with the trademark function of reducing consumer 
search costs than with other goals. The enhanced certainty that 
markholders receive upon registering their marks flows directly from 
 
 
 48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d).  
 49. See id. §§ 1063–1064.  
 50. See id. § 1125 (providing federal cause of action for trademark dilution). 
 51. Id. § 1125(c)(3) (exempting comparative commercial advertising, noncommercial use, and 
news reporting).  
 52. Additionally, while many of the substantive requirements for registering a mark reflect the 
guiding principle of enabling the public to easily identify a particular product from a particular source 
without unduly restricting market competition, not all bans on mark registrations do. For instance, the 
ban of registering marks that are of immoral or scandalous matter, disparage, or comprise flag or coat 
of arms obviously animate concerns other than the dominant consumer-oriented approach. See id. 
§ 1052(a)–(b).  
 53. See supra notes 33–35. 
 54. See Robert Burrell & Michael Handler, Dilution and Trademark Registration 4 (Univ. of 
Queensland, Austl., Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-06, 2008), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1144362.  
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statutory provisions of the Lanham Act, which confer these advantages 
upon a mark’s registration. The increased certainty afforded registered 
marks does not provide a guiding principal as to which, among various 
legal constructions of validity doctrines, the Agency should choose. The 
same holds for the informational function of the registration system. 
Although reducing business clearance costs is predicated on the 
registration containing valuable information, and hence valid marks, this 
goal of the registry says nothing as to how the validity standards should be 
determined or what those standards should try to achieve. That is, the 
public information function of the federal registration system would be 
satisfied as long as only valid marks were registered, regardless of what is 
the underlying goal of the core substantive standards of trademarks. 
Finally, it is not lost on the author that the Trademark Office does not 
actually determine the validity of a mark—technically, only courts make 
such a determination during a trademark validity or infringement suit—the 
Agency decides only whether a mark should be registered. Importantly, 
Part III of this Article demonstrates how the Trademark Office’s legal 
interpretations of ambiguous terms of the Lanham Act can affect the 
decision-making of federal courts, not only in registration determinations, 
but also in trademark validity decisions.  
C. The Formality Associated with the Trademark Registration Process 
Because the deference owed to an agency’s decision depends in part on 
the formality associated with the underlying proceeding, this Subpart’s 
summary of the trademark registration process highlights the formality 
associated with each of the four statutorily authorized adjudications of 
trademark registrations conducted by the Trademark Office. The initial 
determination by the Trademark Office of whether a mark meets the 
federal registration requirements is largely informal in nature. It occurs ex 
parte, meaning only the applicant (and perhaps also the applicant’s 
attorney) and a low-ranking official of the Agency, known as an 
examining attorney, are parties to the proceeding. If the examining 
attorney finds grounds for refusing registration, she will issue an “office 
action” informing the applicant of the reasons why registration is denied. 
The applicant then can argue the examiner is incorrect or amend the 
application to attempt to moot the grounds for refusal. This process may 
occur several times until the examiner either approves the applicant or 
finally refuses to register the mark. As a result, the initial registration 
determination proceeds through a series of negotiations between the 
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applicant and the examining trademark attorney, wherein the former tries 
to convince the latter that the mark should be registered.  
Beyond the authority to make this initial registration determination, the 
Trademark Office also has the statutory authority to adjudicate both 
trademark denials and trademark grants of registration. If the examining 
attorney determines that the mark should not be registered, the aggrieved 
applicant can appeal the decision to the Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board (“TTAB”), an administrative tribunal within the Trademark Office 
composed of administrative trademark judges and high-ranking Patent and 
Trademark Office officials, including the Director of the Patent and 
Trademark Office and the Commissioner of Trademarks.
55
 The process by 
which the Board reviews trademark denials is more formal than the 
process by which the Trademark Office makes the initial registration 
decisions. However, the process by which the Board reviews trademark 
denials does not approximate a judicial proceeding in court. Because 
typically only the aggrieved registrant is a party to a trademark denial 
proceeding, there is no cross-examination of witnesses or any compelling 
need for the strict safeguards associated with an adversary adjudication.
56
 
Nevertheless, the aggrieved trademark registrant can request an oral 
argument and there are situations—for instance, when a third party 
submits a letter of protest—where heightened evidentiary standards 
associated with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply.
57
  
If the examining attorney approves the mark for registration, there are 
two avenues by which a third party who believes she would be damaged 
by the registration of a mark may challenge the trademark examiner’s 
determination before the Trademark Office. First, for a limited time period 
after this initial registration determination, interested parties may 
challenge the validity of the registration by initiating an administrative 
“opposition” proceeding before the TTAB.58 Second, after the opposition 
period has expired and the registration issues, the public may still attack 
the trademark grant by initiating an administrative proceeding before the 
 
 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 1070 (2012). The TTAB is composed of at least three of the Director, Deputy 
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark office, the Commissioner for Patents, the 
Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative trademark judges who are appointed by the 
Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Director. Id. § 1067.  
 56. See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND 
APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE § 1208 (2015), available at http://www.uspto.gov/ 
trademarks-application-process/appealing-trademark-decisions/tbmp-preface [hereinafter TBMP]. 
 57. Id. §§ 1208, 1216. 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2012). Oppositions must be filed within thirty days of the publication of 
the trademark. Id. 
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TTAB to cancel the registration.
59
 The grounds for which a third party 
may oppose a registration of a mark are larger than those that the 
examining attorney can consider in making the initial registration 
decision.
60
 For five years after the initial grant of registration, the grounds 
for cancelling a mark are the same as opposing a mark.
61
 Thereafter, the 
substantive grounds upon which a third party can cancel a registration 
narrow, leading to the mark becoming “incontestable.”62  
These inter partes proceedings before the TTAB are more formal than 
both the initial trademark registration decision and trademark denial 
proceedings. That is, the adjudication of registration grants is designed to 
roughly approximate civil action in federal court.
63
 For instance, these 
inter partes proceedings are largely governed by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.
64
 The TTAB allows discovery and depositions and the party 
opposing registration bears the burden of proof.
65
 Although there is no live 
testimony before the TTAB—proceedings before the Board are conducted 
in writing—the TTAB allows parties to submit transcribed testimony, 
taken under oath and subject to cross-examination.
66
 Parties to TTAB 
proceedings may also request oral argument.
67
  
Adjudications of trademark registration grants or denials by the TTAB 
can be appealed to the Federal Circuit on the record generated in 
Trademark Office proceedings or may be challenged in a civil action in 
federal district court (where additional discovery may be taken and new 
evidence submitted).
68
 Once a party appeals a TTAB decision to a federal 
district court, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is divested. Subsequent 
appeals of district court decisions are to be taken to the regional circuits.
69
 
 
 
 59. Id. § 1064. A third party may oppose the registration of a mark for any substantive ground 
the examining attorney must consider when making the initial registration decision plus two additional 
substantive grounds: dilution by tarnishment and dilution by blurring. Id.  
 60. See id. §§ 1067–1068. 
 61. Id. §§ 1064(1)–(3), 1065. 
 62. Id. § 1065. 
 63. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015) (quoting PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL 
OF PROCEDURE § 102.03 (2014)) (describing “opposition proceedings before the TTAB” as “‘similar 
to a civil action in a federal district court’”). 
 64. Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.116(a), 2.122(a) (2016).  
 65. Id. §§ 2.120, 2.123(a), 2.116(b).  
 66. TBMP, supra note 56, § 102.03; 37 C.F.R. § 2.123. 
 67. 37 C.F.R. § 2.129.  
 68. 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (2012). The appeal to the Federal Circuit is limited to the issues raised and 
the record established before the Board. Id. § 1071(a)(4). The appeal to the district court is by way of 
civil action and is a de novo proceeding. Id. § 1071(b)(1).  
 69. Id. § 1121; see also Williams v. Dep’t of the Army, 715 F.2d 1485, 1490 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 
1983).  
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Despite having two different routes to appeal TTAB decisions, aggrieved 
parties historically have overwhelmingly favored appeal to the Federal 
Circuit over pursuing civil action.
70
 As a result, the primary focus of this 
Article is the application of administrative law principles to Trademark 
Office decisions that are directly appealed to the Federal Circuit. 
Nevertheless, for completeness, this Article also examines the deference 
standards applied by the regional appellate circuits with respect to the 
Trademark Office’s decisions that were initially appealed to a federal 
district court.  
II. THE TRADEMARK OFFICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DOCTRINE 
This Part discusses how, as a matter of formal doctrine, administrative 
law principles apply to review of the Trademark Office’s decision-making 
announced in TTAB proceedings. It then briefly summarizes current 
administrative jurisprudence with respect to the review of an agency’s 
legal and factual determinations and then turns to applying this doctrine to 
the Trademark Office’s decisions. Although this Part examines the 
deference doctrine of all regional circuits, it primarily focuses on the 
Federal Circuit. In doing so, it argues that the appellate court fails to 
provide the Trademark Office’s decisions sufficient deference with respect 
to both the Agency’s legal and factual determinations. Notably, this 
Article’s focus is the deference standard that should apply to TTAB 
decisions and not the initial registration determinations made by an 
examining attorney, as the latter decision cannot be immediately appealed 
to a court.   
 
 
 70. Email from Denis DelGizzi, Technical Program Manager, Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd., 
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to Melissa F. Wasserman, Associate Professor, Univ. of Ill. Coll. of 
Law (Apr. 2, 2015, 2:19 PM CST) (on file with author) (noting that—of the seventy-six pending cases 
on appeal from the TTAB as of April 2, 2015—twenty of the twenty-five ex parte appeals were before 
the Federal Circuit, seventeen of the thirty inter partes opposition proceedings were before the Federal 
Circuit, and ten of the twenty-one cancellation proceedings were before the Federal Circuit). 
Moreover, cases that were terminated in 2012, 2013, and 2014 were also overwhelmingly before the 
Federal Circuit. Id. (noting that in 2012, sixteen of the twenty TTAB inter partes appeals that were 
terminated by a court were before the Federal Circuit; in 2013, eight of the thirteen TTAB inter partes 
appeals that were terminated by a court were before the Federal Circuit; and in 2014, seventeen of the 
twenty TTAB inter partes appeals that were terminated by a court were before the Federal Circuit).   
 This trend seems likely to continue or intensify, at least with respect to ex parte appeals, as recent 
case law holds that § 1071(b) civil actions for review of an ex parte TTAB decision require that the 
aggrieved applicants pay the Trademark Office’s attorney fees regardless of the outcome of the civil 
action. See Shammas v. Focarino, 990 F. Supp. 2d 587 (E.D. Va. 2014).  
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A. Trademark Law and the APA: General Considerations 
This Article assumes that standard administrative law principles govern 
the review of the Trademark Office’s decisions. In 1999, the Supreme 
Court held as such with respect to the Patent Office’s determinations.71 In 
Dickinson v. Zurko, the Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act 
governs review of Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”) 
decisions, the patent counterpart to the TTAB.
72
 Given that the Director of 
the Patent and Trademark Office’s delegated authority to grant patents and 
register trademarks stem from the same statutory provision,
73
 and that the 
statutory authority of the TTAB and the BPAI share significant 
commonalities,
74
 especially at the time Zurko was decided, there is little 
reason to believe that the APA also does not apply to the TTAB’s 
determinations.
75
  
 
 
 71. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 165 (1999). 
 72. Id. 
 73. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“The United States Patent and Trademark office, subject to the 
policy direction of the Secretary of Commerce . . . shall be responsible for the granting and issuing of 
patents and the registration of trademarks . . . .”). 
 74. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1994), with 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (1994) (TTAB’s governing provision), 
at the time Zurko was decided. Section 7 stated: “The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the 
Assistant Commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief shall constitute the [BPAI]. . . . Each appeal . . . 
shall be heard by at least three members of the [BPAI], who shall be designated by the 
Commissioner.” 35 U.S.C. § 7. Section 1067 stated: “The [TTAB] shall include the Commissioner, the 
Deputy Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, and members appointed by the Commissioner. 
. . . Each case shall be heard by at least three members of the Board, the members hearing such case to 
be designated by the Commissioner.” 15 U.S.C. § 1067. The BPAI was later renamed the Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board and transformed into a more formal adjudicatory body with the passage of the 
America Invents Act in 2011. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: 
Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1976–77 (2013) (describing the new 
adjudicatory authority of the Patent Office).  
 75. Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have recently argued that at least two recent Supreme Court 
cases have taken a more limited view of the centrality of administrative law to the patent system than 
Zurko. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era of Patent Stare Decisis, 
65 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2016). More specifically, Benjamin and Rai argue that Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 
P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011), in which the Court held that the higher “clear and convincing” 
standard, rather than a lower “preponderance” standard, governed for proving invalidity of a patent, is 
one such case. See Benjamin & Rai, supra, at 1591. Because the Court did not mention administrative 
law in its decision, but instead relied upon its own pre-APA cases in interpreting the Patent Act, this 
case can be seen as rejecting the application of administrative law during collateral review of patents—
that is, review of patents during patent litigation proceedings rather than direct review of the Patent 
Office’s decision to grant or deny a patent. See id. at 1593–94. Benjamin and Rai also argue that a 
second case, Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012), where the Court considered the proper standard 
of review that should govern the Patent Office’s fact-findings in a civil action before a district court 
where new evidence was submitted, also represents “the Supreme Court’s apparent decision to 
deprioritize administrative law in favor of the stare decisis effect of the Court’s cases that predate the 
rise of the modern administrative state.” Id. at 1565. Reasoning that the reviewing court was acting as 
one of first impression, rather than reviewing the facts found by the Patent Office, the Court again did 
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The APA was enacted in 1946 to provide default rules for all agencies 
and to bring uniformity to agency procedure and judicial review of agency 
action.
76
 Thus, the central inquiry as to what standard of review should 
apply to the reexamination of the Trademark Office’s decisions must start 
with the question of whether the Trademark Act provides a relevant 
standard and displaces the APA.
77
 Historically, the federal trademark 
statute failed to enunciate any standard with respect to review of 
Trademark Office decisions. In 1946, approximately a month after passing 
the APA, Congress enacted the Lanham Act.
78
 While the Lanham Act was 
silent with respect to trademark denials, it did articulate a presumption of 
validity for registered trademarks. Currently, § 1057(b) of the Trademark 
Act states that “[a] certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal 
register . . . . shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered 
mark and of the registration of the mark, of the owner’s ownership of the 
mark, and of the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in 
commerce on or in connection with the good or services specified in the 
certificate.”79 While courts are divided as to whether the establishment of a 
prima facie case under the Lanham Act results in a shift in the burden of 
proof or merely a shift in the burden of production to the opposing party, it 
is clear that § 1057(b) of the Trademark Act did not displace or modify the 
APA.
80
 As the APA states, a “[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to 
supersede or modify [the APA] . . . except to the extent that it does so 
 
 
not rely upon administrative law to hold that de novo review governed. Importantly, the failure of the 
Court to apply administrative law principles in either of these cases does not cast doubt on whether 
standard administrative law principles apply to the direct review of the Agency’s decision when no 
new evidence is submitted, which is always the case when the Federal Circuit reviews TTAB 
determinations. Id.; see also Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65 
DUKE L.J. ONLINE 149, 159 (2016) (arguing that Benjamin and Rai’s argument “underestimates the 
Supreme Court’s breathtaking extension of Chevron deference to trump judicial precedent”). 
 Technically, Zurko held that standard administrative law principles apply to the direct review of 
BPAI factual determinations. Given the intimate relationship between questions of fact and law, there 
is little reason to believe the Court would not also hold that administrative law applies to the review of 
the Patent and Trademark Office’s determinations of law.  
 76. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2012). 
 77. See Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983).  
 78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072, 1091–1096, 1111–1127 (2012). 
 79. Id. § 1057(b). 
 80. For a thorough discussion of how courts have interpreted the “prima facie evidence” 
requirement under the Lanham Act, see Charles L. Cook & Theodore H. Davis Jr., Litigating the 
Meaning of “Prima Facie Evidence” Under the Lanham Act: The Fog and Art of War, 103 
TRADEMARK REP. 437 (2013). The burden-of-proof shifting approach has been adopted by the First, 
Second, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, District of Columbia, and Federal Circuits, whereas the 
burden-of-production shifting approach has been adopted by the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits. Id. at 445–48. 
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expressly.”81 When the Supreme Court has found that a federal statute 
supplanted or modified the APA, the statute in question has explicitly 
indicated such and has often contained specific standards of review (for 
example, “substantial evidence”).82 The language of § 1057(b) simply fails 
to meet this explicit requirement. As a result, the language of the APA 
should govern the review of trademark decisions.  
B. Legal Determinations 
This Subpart begins by briefly summarizing the deference 
jurisprudence associated with the review of agencies’ legal constructions 
and then proceeds by applying this jurisprudence to the Trademark 
Office’s legal determinations announced during TTAB proceedings. This 
Subpart concludes that the Federal Circuit is failing to grant the TTAB’s 
legal determinations sufficient deference.  
1. Deference Jurisprudence with Respect to Legal Determinations 
If an agency’s legal interpretation of the statute it administers is 
reviewable, courts will apply one of three standards: the deferential 
Chevron review, the less deferential Skidmore review, or the no deference 
de novo review. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,
83
 the Supreme Court announced the famous two-part 
Chevron test. Under step one, the court, after “employing traditional tools 
of statutory construction,” asks whether “Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.”84 If the answer is yes, the statute clearly and 
unambiguously resolves the issue and the agency is bound by Congress’s 
express command.
85
 If, however, the statute is unclear, the court proceeds 
to the second step. Under step two, the reviewing court must defer to the 
 
 
 81. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012). 
 82. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 309 (1955) (holding that the Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952, which provided that “[t]he procedure (herein prescribed) shall be the sole and 
exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section,” displaced the 
APA); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012) (stating that courts should review de novo agency 
determinations under the Freedom of Information Act); id. § 7703(c)(1) (directing courts to set aside 
conclusions of the Merit Systems Protection Board if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . or . . . unsupported by substantial evidence”); 
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (“[T]he court shall hold unlawful 
and set aside such rule if the court finds that the rule is not supported by substantial evidence in the 
rulemaking record . . . .”).  
 83. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 84. Id. at 842, 843 n.9.  
 85. Id. at 842–43.  
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agency’s interpretation that is “based on a permissible construction of the 
statute” or that is a “reasonable” construction of the statute that the agency 
is charged with administering.
86
  
Chevron deference, however, is not applicable in every case in which 
an agency interprets a statute that it administers. In United States v. Mead 
Corp., the Supreme Court clarified that an agency’s interpretation is 
eligible for Chevron deference only if Congress has delegated 
interpretative authority (i.e., the ability to speak with the “force of law”) to 
the agency and the agency has “exercise[d] . . . that authority.”87 The Court 
further stated that a congressional delegation of formal adjudicatory or 
rulemaking power is generally sufficient to infer congressional intent to 
delegate interpretative authority to an agency.
88
 Even the subsequent 
decision of Barnhart v. Walton, which emphasized a need for a case-by-
case analysis, did not disturb the principle that formal procedures were 
generally sufficient to infer force-of-law authority.
89
 Although Supreme 
Court jurisprudence has left open the possibility that a grant of less formal 
mechanisms of agency action may, at times, also satisfy the force of law 
requirement,
90
 the Court has failed to provide substantial guidance on what 
types of informal procedures are sufficient to infer such a delegation.
91
  
Mead also made clear that if an agency cannot show that it was 
delegated force-of-law authority or that it exercised such authority, the less 
deferential Skidmore standard typically applies. From a theoretical 
standpoint, the differences between the approaches taken by the Supreme 
Court in Skidmore and in Chevron are substantial. In Skidmore, the Court 
 
 
 86. Id. at 842–44. 
 87. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). 
 88. Id. at 229–31.  
 89. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (emphasizing factors such as the “interstitial 
nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to 
administration of the statute . . . and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a 
long period of time”).  
 90. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231. 
 91. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1445 (2005) (“[C]ourts [have] adopt[ed] inconsistent approaches to the issue of 
Chevron deference when an agency does not use notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal 
adjudication.”).  
 Post-Mead, the Supreme Court has afforded Chevron deference to agency action outside the 
context of notice-and-comment regulations in two instances. In both scenarios, the agency action at 
issue was technically informal adjudication, although the adjudications had formal aspects. Neither 
opinion, however, provided much guidance as to why these adjudications meet the force-of-law 
requirement. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009) (extending Chevron deference to Board 
of Immigration Appeals adjudication interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act); United States 
v. Eurodif S. A., 555 U.S. 305, 316 (2009) (extending Chevron deference to Commerce Department 
interpretation of the Tariff Act in adjudication). 
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concluded that the weight afforded an agency’s legal interpretation “will 
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and 
all those factors which give it power to persuade.”92 By contrast, courts 
applying Chevron defer to an agency’s “reasonable interpretation” of an 
ambiguous statute, regardless of its consistency with previous or 
subsequent statements.
93
 As a result, in a Chevron case, a court must defer 
to a reasonable interpretation, whereas in a Skidmore case, it may defer 
based on how convincing it finds the agency’s construction of the statute.94  
Finally, in a limited number of circumstances, an agency’s legal 
construction may be afforded no deference whatsoever. De novo review is 
warranted when an agency is construing a legal provision that it does not 
have a special responsibility to administer, such as the Constitution or the 
Administrative Procedure Act.
95
 Additionally, § 706(2)(F) of the APA 
contemplates de novo review of agency action when “the facts are subject 
to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”96 To date, courts have largely 
limited the application of § 706(2)(F) to those few situations in which trial 
de novo is guaranteed by statute.
97
  
 
 
 92. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 93. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 94. Some commentators have suggested that Skidmore review is tantamount to de novo review. 
See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and 
Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 849 (2010) (“To some, Skidmore is no 
deference at all—the reviewing court goes along with the agency when, all things considered, it agrees 
with the agency.”). Empirical evidence, however, suggests that judges view Skidmore as an actual 
restraint on their decision-making. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the 
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1259–80 (2007) (finding that, of the 104 
appellate cases from 2001 to 2006 that applied Skidmore, the majority of courts tailored their 
deference in accordance with the factors outlined in Skidmore rather than conducting a de novo-style 
analysis wherein the court adopted its best reading of the statute).  
 95. No one particular agency is charged with administration of the Administrative Procedure Act 
or Title VII. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–552 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (2012).  
 96. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2012). Although this language arguably implies that something other 
than the APA must make the facts “subject to trial de novo,” the Supreme Court has interpreted this 
section of the APA to allow for no deference under the following two circumstances: (1) when “the 
agency factfinding procedures are inadequate”; or (2) “when issues that were not before the agency are 
raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action.” Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). Nevertheless, it is exceedingly rare for courts to find either of 
these circumstances present. To date, there appears to be only one case under which a court has 
applied de novo review because either the agency’s fact-findings were inadequate or because issues 
that were not before the agency were raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory agency action. 
See Porter v. Califano, 592 F.2d 770, 782–83 (5th Cir. 1979) (involving substantial bias in the agency 
disciplinary proceeding); Ronald M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative 
Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 273–74 & n.17 (1986). 
 97. See, e.g., Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 748 (1978) (holding that de novo trial of citizenship issues 
in deportation cases is guaranteed by statute); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) (holding 
that trial de novo of federal employees’ title VII claims is guaranteed by statute); Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1532 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1511 
 
 
 
 
2. Applying Deference Jurisprudence to the Trademark Office’s Legal 
Determinations  
The Trademark Act, like many other organic statutes, does not always 
speak to the precise question at issue. That is, the legal requirements that 
dictate when a mark merits registration often allow for ample 
interpretation. Take for instance the doctrine of likelihood of confusion, 
which precludes the registration of marks that are likely to cause confusion 
with other existing marks. The Trademark Act states that a mark cannot be 
registered if it “so resembles [an existing] mark . . . as to be likely . . . to 
cause confusion.”98 The courts and the Trademark Office have held that 
making a likelihood of confusion determination turns on a multifactor 
analysis.
99
 Perhaps the best evidence of the substantial interpretative 
discretion associated with the likelihood of confusion analysis is that each 
of the circuits has developed its own formulation of this test. Although 
some commonality in factors exists across circuits, there is also great 
diversity not just with respect to which factors are considered, but also as 
to how much weight each factor is prescribed.
100
 Even though not every 
trademark registration determination may involve the interpretation of a 
pure legal standard, it will, at a minimum, involve the application of a 
legal standard to a factual finding. Because the highly deferential standard 
announced in Chevron applies both to pure questions of legal 
interpretation and to interpretations involving the application of legal 
standards to facts,
101
 every trademark registration determination could 
theoretically warrant strong judicial deference.  
 
 
S. Ct. 1690, 1694 (2012) (holding that patent denials appealed to the US District Court for the District 
of Columbia under 35 U.S.C. § 145 allow for a trial de novo). 
 98. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2012).  
 99. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits utilize a six-factor test; the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and 
Eleventh Circuits utilize a seven-factor test; the First, Second, Sixth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits utilize 
an eight-factor test; the Third Circuit utilizes a ten-factor test; and the Federal Circuit utilizes a 
thirteen-factor test. For an excellent summary of how the multifactor tests vary across circuits, see 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1581, 1587–90 (2006). 
 100. For instance, every circuit appears to consider the following four factors: the similarity of the 
marks, the proximity of the goods, the evidence of actual confusion, and the strength of the plaintiff’s 
mark. See id. (noting that some circuits weigh heavily certain factors that other circuits claim to 
ignore).  
 101. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System 
Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 297 (2007) (“Under the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, Chevron applies both to pure questions of legal interpretation and to the interpretation 
involved in applying legal standards to factual findings . . . .”). 
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Should trademark decisions be afforded the highly deferential Chevron 
standard? The answer to this question depends on whether Congress 
intended the Agency to speak with the force of law. Thus, a starting point 
is to determine whether Congress has granted the Trademark Office 
substantive rulemaking or formal adjudicatory authority—the two formal 
procedures that Supreme Court precedent suggests merit deference.
102
 The 
APA, which governs the way most agencies partake in rulemaking and 
adjudication, defines a rule as “an agency statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, 
or prescribe law or policy.”103 Rulemaking is defined as the “process for 
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”104 By contrast, adjudications 
are defined as matters other than rulemaking.
105
 Thus, any agency decision 
that involves a final decision other than rulemaking, such as the decision 
to grant or deny registration of a trademark, constitutes agency 
adjudication.
106
 
Importantly, while many agencies possess the authority to adjudicate 
and hence interpret the statutes they administer on a case-by-case basis,
107
 
having statutory authority to adjudicate in some way does not mean the 
agency has been granted formal adjudicatory authority. Formal 
adjudication under the APA resembles a civil judicial trial, wherein the 
 
 
 102. There is an open question as to whether all grants of substantive rulemaking authority or 
formal adjudicatory authority are enough to warrant Chevron deference. While scholars and courts 
tend to conclude that a grant of formal adjudicatory power or substantive rulemaking authority is 
accompanied by force of law authority, a subset of scholars is beginning to question this conclusion. 
The concept of force of law is more developed with respect to rulemaking than formal adjudication. 
See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 470–72 (2013); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 
ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 827–30 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with 
the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 472 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill 
& Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 890 (2001); Wasserman, supra note 74, 
at 1989–94.  
 103. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). 
 104. Id. § 551(5). 
 105. Id. § 551(6)–(7). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Both the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission are known for 
heavily relying on adjudication to announce legal interpretations of the statutes they administer. See, 
e.g., Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 
274, 274 (1991) (footnotes omitted) (“Despite having been granted both rulemaking and adjudicatory 
power in its statutory charter more than half a century ago, the [NLRB] has chosen to formulate policy 
almost exclusively through the process of adjudication.”); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of 
Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 257, 263 (“Adjudication was the primary function of . . . the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and it was a substantial part of the business of the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) as well.”). 
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parties have the right to present oral arguments,
108
 to conduct cross-
examination of witnesses,
109
 and to make exceptions to prior rulings.
110
 
Additionally, the APA requires that a neutral hearing officer, who is 
prohibited from participating in ex parte communications,
111
 conduct the 
formal adjudication by presiding over the case and submitting written 
opinions that provide the legal and factual basis of the agency’s 
conclusions.
112
 The majority of agency adjudications, however, are 
informal in nature. If formality is not required, then the APA imposes only 
minimal procedures for adjudications.
113
 Thus, agency decisions made 
under “informal adjudication” are not afforded trial-like protections, but 
instead often rely on the use of “inspections, conferences, and 
negotiations.”114  
To begin, the Trademark Office likely does not possess the power to 
issue binding rules that carry the force of law on the core issues of 
trademark law.
115
 The broadest expression of the Agency’s rulemaking 
 
 
 108. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012). While the majority of formal hearings require oral arguments, the 
APA has accepted oral arguments from hearings “determining claims for money or benefits or 
applications for initial licenses.” Id. 
 109. Id. Section 556 requires cross-examination only “as may be required for a full and true 
disclosure of the facts.” Id.  
 110. Id. § 557(c). 
 111. Id. § 557(d)(1). 
 112. Id. § 557(c)(3)(A)–(B). Additionally, the APA places the burden of proof on the proponent of 
the adjudicatory order and requires that the order be supported by reliable, probative, and substantial 
evidence. Id. § 556(d). Formal adjudication also requires the agency to provide notice of the hearing to 
the parties in the proceeding and afford an opportunity to participate in the hearing. Id. § 554. 
 113. Section 555 of the APA does provide some protections that apply to all APA proceedings, 
including limited rights to appear before an agency; limits on agency subpoena power; the right to 
retain copies of information submitted to an agency; the right to inspect copies of testimony 
transcripts; and the right to prompt written notice of the denial of any written petition application or 
request, including a brief explanation of the reasons for the denial. Id. § 555. As a result, agency 
procedures in “informal adjudications” are typically prescribed only under the agency’s enabling act, 
adopted by the agency itself, or required by constitutional due process. Melissa M. Berry, Beyond 
Chevron’s Domain: Agency Interpretations of Statutory Procedural Provisions, 30 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 541, 549 (2007). 
 114. U.S. ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 5 (1st Sess. 1941). 
 115. Remarkably, the Federal Circuit has never squarely held that the Agency lacks the 
substantive rulemaking authority. In fact, surprisingly few Federal Circuit opinions have even 
referenced § 1123 of the Lanham Act. I could find only one Federal Circuit case that explicitly 
referenced 15 U.S.C. § 1123—Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 
994 F.2d 1569, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  
 Nevertheless, the language of § 1123 of the Lanham Act is almost identical to that of the Patent 
Act. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly interpreted the latter grant as primarily enabling the Patent and 
Trademark Office to make rules only on a variety of procedural matters. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 
F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, it seems highly likely that the appellate court would also 
hold that the Trademark Office lacks substantive rulemaking authority.  
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authority can be found in § 1123 of the Lanham Act, stating that “[t]he 
Director shall make rules . . . for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent 
and Trademark Office under this [Act].”116 Interpreting § 1123 as 
providing the Agency with only procedural rulemaking authority is 
reasonable. The word “conduct” in the Agency’s grant of rulemaking 
authority suggests that Congress intended the Agency to make rules only 
with respect to the process that will take place in the course of the hearing 
and not the substantive standards that govern registration. Moreover, when 
other agencies have the power to make substantive rules with the force of 
law in the course of a series of adjudications, the language does not tend to 
track that of § 1123 but is instead broader, such as the “power to make 
rules to carry out the provisions of this Act.”117 Thus, it seems unlikely the 
Trademark Office possesses the first formal procedure that the Supreme 
Court suggested merits Chevron deference.  
What about the second formal procedure that the Court suggested is 
sufficient to imply a grant of force of law authority? That is, has the 
Trademark Office been granted formal adjudicatory authority? At first 
blush, the answer is yes. As discussed above, the Trademark Office has 
long had the authority to partake in a number of adjudications, including 
the adjudication of trademark registration grants in which adverse parties 
dispute the eligibility of a particular, proposed trademark for federal 
registration.
 
As the Supreme Court has recently stated, these inter partes 
proceedings “are in many ways ‘similar to a civil action in a federal 
district court.’”118 For instance, these proceedings are largely governed by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and both parties have the right to 
discovery and to conduct dispositions.
119
 Perhaps most telling is that the 
Trademark Office’s regulations for adjudication of trademark registration 
 
 
 116. 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (2012). 
 117. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2012) (authorizing the National 
Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) to “make, amend, and rescind . . . such rules and regulations as may 
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter”); Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 154(i) (2012) (authorizing the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to “perform any and 
all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as 
may be necessary in the execution of its functions”); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 371(a) (2012) (authorizing the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to “promulgate regulations 
for the efficient enforcement of this chapter”). The NLRB, the FCC, and the FDA all have the power 
to promulgate legislative rules. See, e.g., Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 
695–98 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) grants the FDA the authority to issue 
legislative rules interpreting the act). 
 118. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015) (quoting PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL 
OF PROCEDURE § 102.03 (2014)). 
 119. Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 C.F.R. §§ 2.116(a), 2.122(a) (2014).  
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grants provide for the trial-type protections afforded under formal 
adjudication, including many, if not all, of the APA requirements of § 554 
and §§ 556–557.120 
 
 
 120.  For example, the regulations require the agency to do the following: (1) provide notice of any 
inter partes proceedings, compare APA, 5 U.S.C. § 554(b) (2012), with Rules of Practice in Trademark 
Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 2.105 (2016) (“Notification to parties of opposition proceeding[s]”), and 37 C.F.R. 
§ 2.113 (“Notification to parties of cancellation proceeding[s]”); (2) prohibit ex parte communications 
regarding the merits during the decisional process, compare 5 U.S.C. § 557(d), with Rules of Practice 
Before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 37 C.F.R. § 10.93 (“Contact with officials. . . . In an 
adversary proceeding, including any inter partes proceeding before the Office, a practitioner shall not 
communicate, or cause another to communicate, as to the merits of the cause with a judge, official, or 
Office employee before whom the proceeding is pending, except: (1) In the course of official 
proceedings in the cause. (2) In writing if the practitioner promptly delivers a copy of the writing to 
opposing counsel or to the adverse party if the adverse party is not represented by a practitioner. 
(3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel to the adverse party if the adverse party is not 
represented by a practitioner. (4) As otherwise authorized by law.”); (3) allow, in certain 
circumstances, the right to conduct cross-examination, compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), with Rules of 
Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 2.123(e)(3) (“Every adverse party shall have full opportunity 
to cross-examine each witness.”); (4) permit parties to seek a rehearing of the initial three-judge panel 
decision, compare 5 U.S.C. § 557(b), with Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 C.F.R. §2.129(c) 
(“Any request for rehearing or reconsideration or modification of a decision issued after final hearing 
must be filed within one month from the date of the decision.”); (5) afford parties an opportunity to 
participate in those proceedings, compare 5 U.S.C. § 554(c), with Rules of Practice in Trademark 
Cases, 37 C.F.R. §2.101(b) (“Any person who believes that he, she or it would be damaged by the 
registration of a mark on the Principal Register may file an opposition . . . .”), and 37 C.F.R. § 2.111 
(“Filing a petition for cancellation . . . Any person who believes that he, she or it is or will be damaged 
by the registration may file a petition . . . for cancellation of the registration . . . .”); (6) place the 
burden of proof on the moving party to establish that she is entitled to the requested relief, compare 5 
U.S.C. § 556(d), with Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 2.116 (“Except as otherwise 
provided, and wherever applicable and appropriate, procedure and practice in inter partes proceedings 
shall be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); and (7) ensure that parties to the formal 
adjudications are entitled to present their case by documentary evidence, compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(d), 
with Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 2.122 (Matters in evidence), § 2.123 (Trial 
testimony in inter partes cases), § 2.124 (Depositions upon written questions), § 2.127 (Motions), and 
§ 2.128 (Briefs at final hearing).  
 Typically, the hearing officers in a formal adjudication are administrative law judges. See 5 
U.S.C. § 556(b) (requiring that the head of the agency, one or more members of the collegial body that 
heads an agency, or administrative law judges serve as hearing officers in a formal proceeding). The 
Lanham Act requires that high-ranking trademark officials and administrative trademark judges, not 
administrative law judges, preside over the proceeding. 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (2012). In general, 
administrative trademark judges enjoy less independence in their decision-making than do 
administrative law judges. See Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 
1101, 1145–46 (2006). However, not all formal adjudications must be presided over by one of the 
three hearing officers outlined in § 556(b) if the organic statute specifically designated another board 
or employee to preside. Section 556(b) states, “This subchapter does not supersede the conduct of 
specified classes of proceedings, in whole or in part, by or before boards or other employees specially 
provided for by or designated under statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 556(b). The Lanham Act does explicitly 
require that “[i]n every case of . . . opposition to registration . . . or application to cancel the 
registration of a mark, the Director shall . . . direct a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board to determine 
and decide the respective rights of registration.” 15 U.S.C. § 1067(a). Thus, the Trademark Office’s 
regulations requiring that the hearing officers of TTAB proceedings be Administrative Trademark 
Judges also conforms with the APA requirements for formal adjudication.  
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Of course, the question is not simply whether the Trademark Office 
thought it was best to effectuate these inter partes proceedings through 
formal adjudication, but instead whether Congress intended the Agency do 
so. Agencies, after all, are always free to opt into more formal procedures 
than their organic statutes require. Congress typically evinces its intent to 
grant formal adjudicatory authority to an agency by utilizing the triggering 
language for formal adjudication. Section 554 of the APA states that 
“every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the 
record after opportunity for an agency hearing” triggers the formal 
procedures outlined in § 554 and §§ 556–557.121 Thus, if the Lanham Act 
included both the phrases “hearing” and “on the record” when describing 
inter partes proceedings, it would appear that the Trademark Office had 
been delegated formal adjudicatory power.
122
 These phrases, however, are 
conspicuously absent from the Lanham Act. As a result, if Congress did 
intend to grant formal adjudicatory authority to the Agency, it did not 
utilize the most straightforward way of doing so.
123
  
Nevertheless, there is some reason to believe that Congress intended 
the Trademark Office to effectuate inter partes proceedings through formal 
adjudication. Even though the legislative history associated with the 
creation of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board is sparse, it did state 
that Congress intended inter partes proceedings before the TTAB to be 
“similar to the practice which presently obtains in the case of patent 
interferences.”124 At the time the TTAB was created, and until patent 
interferences were fully phased out by the America Invents Act, these 
proceedings were adversarial in nature and shared the hallmarks of civil 
 
 
 121. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2012).  
 122. See Berry, supra note 113, at 551–52 (“[N]o one would dispute that formal procedures 
should be required if the enabling statute includes ‘on the record’ language . . . .”). 
 123. It is, however, unusual for an agency to adopt more formal proceedings than what its organic 
statute requires in effectuating proceedings. Formal adjudication is more time consuming and costly 
than its informal counterpart. Originally, inter partes review was conducted by the Commissioner. S. 
REP. NO. 85-1960 (1958). It was not until 1958 that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board was 
created. H.R. 8826, 85th Cong. (1958) (enacted). The legislative history surrounding its creation 
suggests that the Commissioner was becoming taxed with such proceedings and the TTAB was created 
to relieve the Commissioner of his work. S. REP. NO. 85-1960, at 1–6 (1958). It is, however, 
interesting to note that the Trademark Office has always utilized formal proceedings to carry out 
oppositions and cancellations. The very first regulations that effectuated inter partes in 1963 required 
as such. Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 2.117 (1963) (noting that the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure generally govern inter partes proceedings). For better or for worse, the Trademark 
Office has not wavered from this position.  
 124. S. REP. NO. 85-1960, at 5 (1958). A patent interference proceeding, which is also known as a 
priority contest, is an inter partes proceeding to determine the priority issues of multiple patent 
applications. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2006).  
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trials.
125
 The US Patent and Trademark Office’s regulations that governed 
patent interference proceedings stated that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure applied, banned ex parte communications, allowed parties to 
request oral argument, and guaranteed discovery.
126
 Although regulations 
governing TTAB proceedings do not provide insight as to why the Agency 
effectuated inter partes proceedings through formal adjudication, it is 
possible that the Trademark Office felt the legislative history associated 
with the creation of the TTAB compelled the Agency to do so.
127
 
If Congress did grant formal adjudicatory power to the Trademark 
Office, Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that such a grant is 
generally enough to infer Congress delegated interpretative authority to 
the Agency. Even though courts have almost uniformly equated a grant of 
formal adjudicatory authority with force-of-law authority, it is likely that 
some subset of formal adjudication grants is insufficient to trigger the 
application of the Chevron framework.
128
 Alternatively, it is possible 
Congress did not intend the Trademark Office to effectuate inter partes 
proceedings through formal adjudication. In that case—or for the 
adjudication of trademark denials, which are informal in nature—the 
Supreme Court’s Chevron jurisprudence has suggested that other types of 
adjudication short of formal adjudication authority may be accompanied 
with force-of-law authority and hence merit Chevron deference.
129
 Thus, 
the question remains whether the Trademark Office’s grant of adjudicatory 
powers, whether formal or informal, included force-of-law authority. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s doctrine has not been particularly 
 
 
 125. Any patent application with an effective filing date of March 16, 2013, or later will not be 
able to initiate an interference proceeding. Derivation proceedings are replacing interference 
proceedings in the Patent Act. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 135).  
 126. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2301.01 (2015), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/ 
(bans ex parte communications); 37 C.F.R. § 41.200 (2016) (noting that patent interference is a 
contested case subject to the procedures set forth in subpart D of Part 41); § 41.124 (oral argument); 
§ 41.150 (discovery); § 41.152 (applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence).  
 127. See Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 2.117 (1963). 
 128. For instance, the Supreme Court almost uniformly equates a grant of formal adjudicatory 
authority with the ability to speak with the force of law. In one of the few (possibly only) times the 
Supreme Court has found a conferral of formal adjudicatory powers to an agency insufficient to infer a 
delegation of interpretative authority, the Court faced a split-enforcement model, wherein one agency 
had rulemaking authority and the other had formal adjudicatory powers. See Martin v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 155 (1991) (finding that the Secretary of Labor, 
which had rulemaking authority, has interpretative authority over the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act and that the Health Review Commission, which had formal adjudicatory powers, was merely a 
neutral arbitrator that lacked force-of-law authority).  
 129. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/7
  
 
 
 
 
2016] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE TRADEMARK SYSTEM 1539 
 
 
 
 
helpful in providing a framework for when informal adjudication carries 
force-of-law authority or when a grant of formal adjudicatory powers is 
insufficient to infer a delegation of interpretative authority.
130
  
Arguably, an important factor in determining whether a grant of 
adjudicatory authority carries with it force of law authority is whether 
Congress intended the agency to make law and policy—or generalized 
determinations that affect the rights of many—during its adjudications.131 
That is, a grant of adjudicatory power is more likely to be accompanied 
with interpretative authority when Congress intended the outcome of those 
adjudications to bind both the parties to the adjudication and agency 
personnel. It is clear that the Trademark Office has the authority to make 
determinations that have coercive effects on the parties to the adjudication. 
The Trademark Office is authorized to make legally binding 
determinations—determinations of whether a trademark should be 
registered.
132
 While TTAB decisions are always binding on the trademark 
examiner who made the initial determination, a subset of TTAB 
determinations are binding on all agency personnel. TTAB decisions that 
are designated as precedential bind all trademark examining attorneys 
making initial registration decisions as well as the Board. Thus, these 
precedential decisions are likely the best candidates for receiving Chevron 
deference.
133
  
Of course, the key inquiry is whether Congress intended the TTAB to 
make determinations that bind agency personnel and the parties to the 
adjudication, not whether the Agency voluntarily elected to make a subset 
of TTAB decisions precedential. Perhaps the easiest way for Congress to 
evince such intent would have been to include language in the Lanham Act 
that TTAB decisions can have precedential effect. While no such language 
is included in the Lanham Act, such express statutory intent does not 
 
 
 130. For instance, the Court cited only one case to support the proposition that informal 
adjudication may also warrant Chevron deference in its Mead decision. Id. at 231 (citing NationsBank 
of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–57, 263 (1995), in which the Court 
had extended Chevron deference to an informal adjudication by the Comptroller of the Currency 
interpreting the National Bank Act).  
 131. Wasserman, supra note 74, at 1991–93.  
 132. Moreover, when the Trademark Office’s legal constructions are announced by the TTAB, 
they are always self-executing, in that they are binding without the need for judicial enforcement. 
 133. TBMP, supra note 56, § 101.03 (“Decisions that are designated by the Board ‘citable as 
precedent,’ ‘precedent of the Board,’ or ‘for publication in full’ are citable as precedent. Decisions 
which are not so designated, or which are designated for publication only in digest form, are not 
binding on the Board, but may be cited for whatever persuasive weight to which they may be 
entitled.”). Additionally, the Supreme Court recently made clear that the TTAB’s decision to deny or 
uphold a federal registration of a mark could have preclusive effects on a later infringement action 
involving the same mark. B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1540 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1511 
 
 
 
 
appear to be a necessary prerequisite for a grant of formal adjudication to 
include force-of-law authority. Other agencies that have received Chevron 
deference for legal constructions announced during formal adjudications 
also fail to have such explicit language in their organic statutes.
134
 
Moreover, there are persuasive reasons to believe that Congress 
envisioned the TTAB to announce decisions that bind the Board as well as 
trademark examining attorneys. Agencies, especially those like the 
Trademark Office that have large numbers of low-ranking officials making 
hundreds of thousands of decisions each year, must have mechanisms to 
ensure consistency in determinations across decision makers. As a result, 
it seems likely that Congress intended the TTAB to issue precedential 
decisions or decisions that would provide binding guidance to agency 
decision makers on unsettled areas of law.  
A full analysis of whether an agency’s decision merits Chevron 
deference should also consider whether the adjudicatory body speaks for 
the agency—that is, the extent to which the agency head oversees the 
adjudication. In most agencies, formal adjudications are conducted by 
administrative law judges (“ALJs”).135 In some agencies, the agency head 
is obligated to review the ALJ’s determination and make an affirmative 
decision to uphold or reverse the decision.
136
 In others, agency heads have 
no such obligation, and hence the ALJ’s determinations effectively 
become those of the agency.
137
 As John Golden has recently noted, the 
formal adjudications the Supreme Court cited in Mead as warranting 
Chevron deference involved the former paradigm—that is, agency heads 
made affirmative decisions which were subsequently appealed to the 
federal courts.
138
 Golden makes a compelling argument that only formal 
adjudications affirmatively reviewed by agency heads should be eligible 
for Chevron deference.
139
 Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai, however, note 
that Mead did not definitively answer the question of the extent to which 
an agency head must oversee an adjudication in order for it to have the 
 
 
 134. For instance, the National Labor Relations Act does not state that the National Labor 
Relations Board’s decisions should have precedential force. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (2012).  
 135. Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative Agency 
Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 970 (1991).  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 971–75. 
 138. John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE L.J. 1657 
(2016).  
 139. Id. 
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force of law.
140
 In fact, Benjamin and Rai point out that there is a circuit 
split on this exact issue.
141
  
Notably, TTAB determinations likely meet the more demanding 
interpretation of agency head involvement. Although there is no formal 
appeal of TTAB decisions to the Director of the Trademark Office, the 
head of the Patent and Trademark Office has the effective ability to affirm, 
modify, or reverse the Board’s decisions. The Trademark Act states that 
the TTAB is composed not only of administrative trademark judges but 
also high–ranking Patent and Trademark Office officials, such as the 
Director, Deputy Director, and the Commissioner for Trademarks.
142
 In In 
re Alappat,
143
 the Federal Circuit held that near identical language in the 
Patent Act enables the Director to review and reverse a decision of the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the then patent counterpart to 
the TTAB, through the process of stacking an expanded panel to include 
like-minded officials to reverse the original panel decision. While the 
ability to reverse a TTAB decision by stacking an expanded panel 
provides less control than if the Trademark Act gave the Director the 
ability to reverse any TTAB decision on her own accord, the outcome is 
functionally equivalent. Moreover, the Director of the Patent and 
Trademark Office must concur that a TTAB decision should be given 
precedential status. Hence, only those decisions which the Director 
explicitly agrees should bind agency personnel will have such an effect.
144
 
Given that the Director of the Trademark Office exercises significant 
control over TTAB outcomes, including over which outcomes have 
precedential effect, the Board appears to speak for the Agency.  
Finally, TTAB determinations are not similar to the types of 
adjudications that the Supreme Court has held do not merit deference, 
such as high-volume determinations made by low-ranking officials.
145
 
While trademark examiners make close to 100,000 decisions a year 
 
 
 140. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 75, at 1584.  
 141. Id. 
 142. 15 U.S.C. § 1067(b) (2012). While each case before the Board is heard by panels of three 
decision makers, the Board may use an augmented panel in a case involving precedent-setting issues 
of exceptional importance. TBMP, supra note 56, § 540.  
 143. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
 144. The fact the Lanham Act specifically states that it is the Director of the Trademark Office 
who has the ultimate decision to refuse to register the opposed mark, or cancel the registration of a 
mark, also suggests that Congress envisioned the TTAB to be a law-making vehicle that speaks for the 
Agency. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1067–1068 (2012).  
 145. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001) (noting that decisions such as 
tariff rulings that are “churned out” at a high volume by low-ranking officials are unlikely to have the 
“force of law”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1542 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1511 
 
 
 
 
regarding the registrability of marks, only a small portion of these 
decisions are appealed to the TTAB.
146
 The TTAB decides fewer than one 
thousand cases each year, of which fewer than fifty are designated as 
precedential.
147
 The extent to which one of these factors or combination of 
factors the courts will find compelling remains to be seen. What is clear, 
however, is that the denial of Chevron deference to the Trademark 
Office’s legal constructions announced during TTAB proceedings is not 
an open and shut case.  
The Federal Circuit’s decisions with respect to the Trademark Office’s 
legal constructions tell an intriguing tale. Shortly after its inception, the 
Federal Circuit held that the TTAB’s legal interpretations should be 
reviewed de novo, citing to the precedent of its predecessor court as 
controlling on this issue.
148
 Interestingly, the Federal Circuit did not revisit 
this issue after the Supreme Court’s Chevron decision in 1984, which 
substantially increased the sphere of agency decisions warranting strong 
deference, but instead continued to afford TTAB legal interpretations no 
 
 
 146. See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014, at 158 tbl.18 (2014) (noting that 92,126 trademark 
applications were under initial examination during the 2014 fiscal year). 
 147. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK PUBLIC 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 23 (noting that the TTAB issued 676 final decisions 
in fiscal year 2013). That is not to say that every factor weighs towards a finding that Congress 
intended the Trademark Office to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the 
Lanham Act. For instance, the TTAB’s scope of authority under the Lanham Act is arguably a neutral 
factor in this determination. One could argue that because the TTAB may bar registration of a mark, at 
least within the first five years of registration, for a larger set of substantive grounds than a trademark 
examiner that Congress envisioned the TTAB to announce legal determinations that carry the force of 
law. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1067–1068 (delineating the set of substantive grounds upon which the TTAB and 
trademark examiner may bar registration of a mark). Congress, in 1999, amended the Lanham Act to 
include the latter two substantive grounds after the Trademark Office had held it was unable to do so. 
Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218 (1999). For an empirical 
examination of the role of dilution at the Trademark Office, see Jeremy N. Sheff, Dilution at the 
Patent and Trademark Office, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 79 (2014). This argument does 
not hold for TTAB adjudication of trademark denials. However, one could also argue that because 
federal registration does not give rise to the trademark right itself but only enhances the legal 
protections that spring from using the mark in commerce, the Agency’s scope of authority under the 
Lanham Act therefore counsels against finding that the Trademark Office was delegated force of law 
authority.   
 148. The Federal Circuit adopted the case law of its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals, as controlling precedent in its first decision. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982). Subsequent Federal Circuit cases that held no deference should be afforded the 
TTAB’s legal interpretations of the Lanham Act have cited the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
as precedent. See, e.g., Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distributors, Inc., 748 F.2d 669, 671 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Interstate Brands Corp. v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 576 F.2d 926, 929 
(CCPA 1978)).  
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deference at all.
149
 Then in 1993, the Federal Circuit applied Chevron 
deference to the TTAB’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision of the 
Lanham Act for the first time in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell 
Document Management Products.
150
 The court did so without any 
discussion of the previous nine years of precedent that had held otherwise 
and largely stated, without analysis, that the Chevron framework 
governed.
151
 As a result, it may not be too surprising that the Eastman 
Kodak opinion has had a limited impact on the Federal Circuit’s 
jurisprudence. The court has largely ignored it and overwhelmingly 
continues to review the TTAB’s legal interpretations of the Lanham Act 
without deference.
152
  
Even more curiously, in the same year that Eastman Kodak was 
decided, the Federal Circuit held in Merck & Co. v. Kessler that the Patent 
Office’s legal determinations were not eligible for Chevron deference 
because the agency did not possess substantive rulemaking authority.
153
 At 
the time that Merck was decided, there was considerable confusion over 
when an agency’s legal determinations were Chevron eligible, a question 
that scholars have dubbed “Chevron step zero.”154 Regional circuits were 
split on whether substantive rulemaking authority was a requirement for 
Chevron deference.
155
 In 2000, however, the Supreme Court in Mead 
 
 
 149. See, e.g., Weiss Assocs., Inc. v. HRL Assocs., Inc. 902 F.2d 1546, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
(stating that the TTAB’s determinations of law are reviewed de novo); Electronic Design & Sales, Inc. 
v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 954 F.2d 713, 715 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (same).  
 150. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co., 994 F.2d 1569, 1571 
(Fed. Cir. 1993).  
 151. Id. at 1571–76. 
 152. The Federal Circuit has only cited the case a handful of times. See, e.g., Princeton Vanguard, 
LLC v. Frito-Lay North Am., Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (stating that the TTAB’s legal 
conclusions are reviewed de novo, without mentioning Eastman); In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (same). 
 153. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Merck specifically held 
that the Patent and Trademark Office lacked substantive rulemaking authority to interpret the Patent 
Act. However, the language of rulemaking authority in the Patent Act and the Lanham Act is virtually 
identical. Thus, the reasoning in Merck should also apply to rulemaking authority with respect to the 
Lanham Act. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (2012) (“The Director shall make rules and regulations, not 
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office under this 
chapter.”), with 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“The Office may establish regulations, not inconsistent 
with law, which shall govern the conduct of proceedings in the Office . . . .”). It does not appear that 
the Federal Circuit has ever explicitly held that the Trademark Office lacks substantive rulemaking 
authority, nor has it analyzed what effect this lack of authority would have on the deference applied to 
the agency’s legal constructions of the Lanham Act.  
 154. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 102, at 835; Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 
92 VA. L. REV. 187, 208 (2006) (noting that the major source of disagreement among the Justices 
involves whether Chevron is applicable at all).  
 155. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 102, at 849 n.83 (noting that courts were divided initially on 
whether agencies that lack legislative rulemaking authority are eligible for Chevron deference).  
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rejected the contention that substantive rulemaking authority was 
necessary for an agency’s legal construction to be Chevron eligible. That 
is, Mead held that either a grant of rulemaking or formal adjudicatory 
authority was typically enough to infer a congressional intent to delegate 
force of law authority to an agency.  
After Mead was decided, the Federal Circuit, at a minimum, should 
have revisited its Merck decision and analyzed whether the Trademark 
Office possessed formal adjudicatory authority. Better yet, the court 
should have considered whether the inter partes proceedings, even if 
perhaps not specifically required by Congress to be effectuated through 
formal adjudication, should nonetheless be the types of adjudications that 
warrant strong judicial deference. That, however, never happened. Instead, 
the court continued to review the Trademark Office’s legal constructions 
of the Lanham Act de novo. 
Though it is not clear that the Trademark Office’s legal determinations 
warrant Chevron deference, what about Skidmore? Are there reasons to 
believe that the Agency’s legal constructions of the Lanham Act should be 
reviewed de novo? No. As noted above, de novo review is appropriate 
only in a limited number of circumstances, including a possible statutory 
guarantee of a trial de novo.
156
 Although, the Lanham Act does guarantee 
a trial de novo—an individual dissatisfied with a TTAB decision may 
pursue a civil action in a US District Court wherein new evidence may be 
presented.
157
 If the district court decision is appealed, it is reviewed by the 
regional appellate court, not the Federal Circuit. If an aggrieved party 
chooses to appeal the TTAB decision directly to the Federal Circuit, rather 
than pursue a de novo civil action, review at the Federal Circuit is limited 
to the evidence produced before the Trademark Office.
158
 Thus, there 
appears no reason under standard principles of administrative law for the 
Federal Circuit’s de novo review of the Trademark Office’s legal 
constructions of the Lanham Act. As a result, at a minimum, the Federal 
 
 
 156. The other situations in which de novo review may be warranted are not present. For instance, 
it is clear that the Trademark Office, and only the Trademark Office, administers the Lanham Act. See 
supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.  
 157. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) (2012). In an analogous patent case, the Supreme Court ruled that 
district courts must review new evidence on a disputed question of fact raised below at the Patent and 
Trademark Office de novo. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 (2012). Note that even though 
Kappos was a patent case, the parallels to district court challenges in trademark registration cases 
make its holding very likely controlling in the trademark context. See Swatch AG v. Beehive 
Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150, 156 (4th Cir. 2014) (reasoning that Kappos is controlling law in the 
trademark context). An aggrieved party that is unhappy with the district court decision can appeal that 
decision to the appropriate regional appellate court. 
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(4).  
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Circuit should afford the TTAB’s legal determinations Skidmore 
deference, and more provocatively Chevron deference.  
This Subpart now turns to evaluating the deference standards that 
should be afforded the TTAB’s legal determinations that are appealed to a 
district court, rather than directly to the Federal Circuit. Although an 
aggrieved party who pursues a civil action in federal district court is 
guaranteed a trial de novo, and thus § 706(2)(F) of the APA would govern, 
it does not necessarily follow that the TTAB’s legal determinations should 
be afforded no deference. Instead, a district court’s decision as to what 
deference, if any, is owed to the TTAB’s legal determinations should 
depend upon whether new evidence is submitted on a disputed question of 
fact, and whether this new evidence is relevant in making the underlying 
legal determination at issue in the appeal. 
If new evidence is presented that informs the underlying legal 
determination, then the district court should make de novo factual findings 
and legal determinations. In this circumstance, the district court is not 
acting as a reviewing court, as envisioned by the APA, but instead as a 
tribunal of first impression.
159
 To illustrate this scenario, imagine that an 
aggrieved party appealed a TTAB decision, in which the Board 
determined that the mark in question was not confusingly similar to 
another mark, to a district court and provided new evidence regarding the 
factual issue of the similarity of the marks. Because the TTAB’s legal 
determination that the two marks were not confusingly similar was 
predicated on a number of factual inquiries, including the similarity of the 
marks, the district court should not afford any deference to the Trademark 
Office’s legal determination. As a matter of logic, a court that is assessing 
new evidence and making a legal determination based on that new 
evidence should not defer to the Trademark Office’s decision because the 
Agency’s legal determination could not have accounted for evidence that 
was never presented.
160
  
Alternatively, if no new evidence is submitted or if the new evidence 
submitted does not inform the underlying legal determination, then 
 
 
 159. Kappos, 132 S. Ct. at 1696.  
 160. Of course, a court that is presented with new evidence can always take into account the 
administrative record before the Trademark Office when making its de novo findings. Kappos, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1700 (quoting Hyatt v. Kappos, 625 F.3d 1320, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (noting that it was within 
the discretion of the district court to “consider the proceedings before and findings of the Patent Office 
in deciding what weight to afford an applicant’s newly-admitted evidence”).  
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deference should arguably be afforded to the TTAB’s legal decision.161 In 
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co.,
162
 the Supreme Court clarified that a 
statutorily required trial de novo is not necessarily inconsistent with 
deferring to an agency’s legal interpretation, even when new evidence is 
submitted. The Court held that Chevron deference can be given to an 
agency’s notice-and-comment rulemaking “without impairing the 
authority of the court to make factual determinations, and to apply those 
determinations to the law, de novo.”163 While some caution is warranted in 
extending the reasoning of Haggar to a setting in which an agency 
interprets a statute for the first time in adjudication, it is likely that Haggar 
would be applicable in at least a subset of cases wherein the new evidence 
was irrelevant to the Agency’s underlying legal determination.  
To illustrate this scenario, imagine the TTAB interpreted the Lanham 
Act to provide trademark registration for product configuration—that is, 
the appearance of the product itself—but nevertheless denied the 
registration of a product configuration because it was functional. Further 
imagine the aggrieved trademark applicant appealed this TTAB decision 
to a district court and provided new evidence regarding the factual issue of 
whether the product configuration was functional. The Trademark Office’s 
legal interpretation of the Lanham Act—that product configuration was 
protectable—is not predicated on a factual finding of functionality. 
Nothing with respect to new evidence submitted as to the functional nature 
of the product configuration in question would be relevant to the TTAB’s 
determination that product configurations as a whole may be eligible for 
trademark registration. Thus, at least for some subset of cases the district 
court could review the factual issues de novo while also deferring to the 
TTAB’s legal interpretations of ambiguous terms in the Lanham Act.  
To date, district courts, and their respective regional circuits, have 
failed to engage in this sort of nuanced analysis. Because the 
overwhelming majority of Trademark Office appeals are taken to the 
Federal Circuit, and not to a district court, the jurisprudence emanating 
from regional circuits on the deference owed to the TTAB’s legal 
constructions of ambiguous terms of the Lanham Act is very sparse.
164
 
 
 
 161. Hyatt, 625 F.3d at 1332 (distinguishing Morgan v. Daniels, 153 U.S. 120 (1894), which held 
that district courts should defer to the Patent and Trademark Office’s factual findings when no new 
evidence was presented, from a case in which new evidence was presented).  
 162. 526 U.S. 380 (1999). 
 163. Id. at 391.  
 164. Another contributing factor to the scarcity of regional circuit opinions addressing the 
deference owed to the TTAB’s legal constructions is that the most frequently litigated issue at the 
TTAB—whether the mark is likely to cause confusion with an existing mark—is treated as a question 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/7
  
 
 
 
 
2016] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE TRADEMARK SYSTEM 1547 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the cases that have been decided demonstrate substantial 
disagreement on this issue. The Seventh Circuit, for example, has held that 
the Trademark Office’s legal constructions are entitled to Chevron 
deference, while the D.C. District Court reviews the Agency’s legal 
determinations de novo.
165
 Moreover, the district courts and their 
respective regional circuits have not systematically acknowledged that the 
deference owed to the TTAB’s legal determinations should depend upon 
both whether new evidence is submitted on a disputed question of fact and 
whether this new evidence is relevant in making the underlying legal 
determination at issue in the appeal.  
In summary, this Subpart argued that the Federal Circuit’s refusal to 
defer to the Trademark Office’s legal determinations is unsupported by 
administrative law jurisprudence. At a minimum, the Federal Circuit 
should afford the TTAB’s legal determinations Skidmore deference. More 
provocatively, this Subpart contends the Federal Circuit should afford the 
Agency’s legal constructions of the Lanham Act Chevron deference. 
Additionally, this Subpart argues that the district courts and their 
respective regional circuits have demonstrated marked disagreement on 
the deference owed to TTAB legal determinations and have yet to engage 
in a sufficiently nuanced analysis in determining the proper standard of 
review that should apply to the Trademark Office’s decisions. While 
aggrieved parties who pursue civil action in federal district court are 
guaranteed a trial de novo, it does not necessarily follow that the 
Trademark Office’s legal determinations are owed no deference. 
Evaluating which deference standard should apply to the TTAB’s legal 
determination should depend upon whether new evidence is presented on a 
 
 
of fact by the majority of the circuits. The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, 
Eleventh, and the District of Columbia Circuits treat likelihood of confusion as a question of fact. See, 
e.g., Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 377 (1st Cir. 1980); American Home Prods. 
Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370 (3d Cir. 1987); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 
1522, 1526 (4th Cir. 1984); Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 217 (5th Cir. 
1985); Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1428–29 (7th Cir. 1985); Mutual of 
Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398–99 (8th Cir. 1987); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 
778 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1985); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 923 
(10th Cir. 1986); Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484, 1488 
n.6 (11th Cir. 1987); Reader’s Digest Ass’n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 804 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). In contrast, the Second and Sixth Circuits treat likelihood of confusion as a mixed question of 
law and fact, while the Federal Circuit treats the question of likelihood of confusion as a question of 
law. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988); Giant Food, Inc. v. Nation’s 
Foodservice, Inc., 710 F.2d 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1983).  
 165. Compare Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron 
deference to the TTAB’s legal construction of the Lanham Act), with Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 
F. Supp. 2d 96, 118 (D.D.C. 2003) (applying de novo review to the TTAB’s legal conclusions).  
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disputed question of fact and whether this new evidence is relevant in 
making the underlying legal determination at issue in the appeal.  
C. Factual Determinations 
This Subpart examines the proper deference standards that should be 
afforded the TTAB’s factual determinations. Similar to the Agency’s legal 
constructions, this Subpart concludes that the proper application of 
administrative law jurisprudence results in the Trademark Office’s fact-
findings being afforded a more deferential standard of review than the 
Federal Circuit currently grants them.  
1. Deference Jurisprudence with Respect to Factual Determinations 
Factual determinations are central to the Trademark Office’s decision-
making because many of the substantive standards for registration are 
factual inquiries. For instance, distinctiveness—the ability of a mark to 
identify the source of goods or services and distinguish those products 
from others in the marketplace, and which is a necessity for a mark’s 
validity and registration—is a factual determination.166 Even the 
substantive standards that are legal determinations—such as the likelihood 
of confusion—depend upon a number of factual inquiries.167 In 
determining whether a mark is confusingly similar to another mark, the 
Trademark Office must consider thirteen factors, such as the similarity of 
 
 
 166. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining “trademark” and “service mark” as words or designs 
used “to identify and distinguish” goods or services). Making this determination depends on the 
categorization of a mark along a continuum of distinctiveness—generic, descriptive, suggestive, 
arbitrary, or fanciful. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 
1976). Generic terms (which are never eligible for trademark registration or protection) identify the 
class of products (such as “e-mail” for e-mail or “tissue paper” for tissue paper); Descriptive marks, 
which can only be registered with proof of secondary meaning, describe some characteristic of the 
product (such as AMERICAN Airlines); Suggestive marks (which automatically meet the 
distinctiveness requirement for registration) require some imagination, thought, or perception to link 
them to the product (such as MICROSOFT for software); Arbitrary marks (which automatically meet 
the distinctiveness requirement for registration) are real words with no connection to the products they 
signify (such as SUN for computers); Fanciful marks (which automatically meet the distinctiveness 
requirement for registration) are coined terms (such as XEROX). The correct categorization of a given 
term along this spectrum is a question of fact. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 
F.2d 786, 792–93 (5th Cir. 1983). Moreover, determining when a mark has secondary meaning in the 
minds of the consumer public is also a factual determination. Id. at 793.  
 167. See Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(recognizing that each DuPont factor presents a question of fact, but the ultimate question of whether a 
likelihood of confusion exists is a question of law). 
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the marks, the similarity and nature of the goods, and the fame of the prior 
mark, all of which are questions of fact.
168
  
Section 706 of the APA outlines the standard of review that should be 
afforded to an agency’s fact-finding. The governing standard of review 
depends upon whether the agency found facts through proceedings in 
which it was compelled to utilize formal adjudication. As noted above, 
formal proceedings mimic civil judicial trials and are governed by § 556 
and § 557 of the APA.
169
 Agencies are compelled to utilize formal 
proceedings when their organic statute requires their adjudicatory 
responsibilities to be effectuated by a “hearing on the record.”170 When an 
agency finds facts through formal procedures, § 706(2)(E) of the APA 
provides that courts may reverse its findings only if they are “unsupported 
by substantial evidence.”171 The Supreme Court in Universal Camera v. 
NLRB
172
 interpreted substantial evidence review as an inquiry into whether 
the facts found were supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”173 That is, 
“substantial evidence” exists if “a reasonable jury could have found” the 
facts the agency found.
174
 
In contrast, informal proceedings are not afforded trial-like protections. 
In fact, the APA imposes only minimal procedures for informal 
adjudications. As a result, these proceedings often rely on the use of 
“inspections, conferences, and negotiations.”175 Agencies typically 
conduct informal adjudications whenever the statute does not contain the 
words “hearing” and “on the record” in elaborating their adjudicatory 
responsibilities. Under 706(2)(A), a court may overturn on review 
informal fact-finding (or fact-findings made in more formal proceedings 
 
 
 168. In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (noting the 
thirteen factors to consider are: the similarity of the marks; the similarity and nature of the goods; the 
similarity of established, likely-to-continue trade channels; the conditions under which and buyers to 
whom sales are made; the fame of the prior mark; the number and nature of similar marks in use on 
similar goods; the nature and extent of any actual confusion; the length of time during and the 
condition under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; the variety 
of goods on which a mark is or is not used; the market interface between the applicant and the owner 
of a prior mark; the extent to which an applicant has the right to exclude others from use of its mark on 
its goods; the extent of potential confusion; and any other established fact probative of the effect of 
use).  
 169. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (2012).  
 170. Id. § 554. 
 171. Id. § 706(2)(E).  
 172. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
 173. Id. at 477 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Labor Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).  
 174. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366–67 (1998).  
 175. U.S. ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES IN 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 5 (1st Sess. 1941).  
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than the agency’s organic statute required) if the fact-findings were done 
in an “arbitrary” or “capricious” manner.176 To satisfy this standard of 
review, the Supreme Court has stated that the reviewing court  
must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of 
the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of 
judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and 
careful, the ultimate standard is a narrow one. The court is not 
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
177
  
While there is disagreement as to whether substantial evidence review 
differs in any meaningful way from arbitrary and capricious review,
178 the 
original intent of the APA seems to have been that substantial evidence 
was a more stringent standard of review than the arbitrary and capricious 
test.
179
 The Federal Circuit jurisprudence draws a meaningful distinction 
between the two standards. The appellate court has stated that “arbitrary 
[or] capricious” is a more deferential standard of review than “substantial 
evidence,” noting that the latter requires “analyz[ing] only whether a 
rational connection exists between the agency’s factfindings and its 
ultimate action” whereas the former requires more than a rational 
connection.
180
 Thus, to the extent the Lanham Act does not compel the 
Trademark Office to effectuate TTAB proceedings through formal 
adjudication, the Federal Circuit should apply the more deferential 
arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing the Agency’s factual 
findings. If, however, Congress intended the Trademark Office to 
effectuate inter partes proceedings through formal adjudication, then the 
 
 
 176. 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971); Ass’n of 
Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984).  
 177. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted); see also Paul R. 
Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 
418, 424 (1981) (characterizing the Overton Park approach as “intrusive substantive review”).  
 178. For instance, a very widely cited and followed case on this issue was an opinion written by 
then-Judge Scalia for the D.C. Circuit that held that the differences between the “arbitrary [or] 
capricious” and “substantial evidence” standards are “largely semantic.” Ass’n of Data Processing 
Serv. Orgs., Inc., 745 F.2d at 683–84; see also Borough of Columbia v. Surface Transp. Bd., 342 F.3d 
222, 241 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the “substantial evidence” and “arbitrary [or] capricious” 
standards provide no meaningful difference in level of deference); Coteau Props. Co. v. Dep’t of 
Interior, 53 F.3d 1466, 1483 (8th Cir. 1995) (same); Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., 42 F.3d 
1560, 1575 (10th Cir. 1994) (same).  
 179. Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 63 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1, 25 (2011) (noting that the substantial evidence standard of review is supposed to be less 
deferential than the arbitrary and capricious test). 
 180. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
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Federal Circuit should apply the less deferential substantial evidence 
standard when reviewing the Agency’s fact-findings made in these formal 
proceedings and the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard 
when reviewing the Agency’s fact-findings announced in trademark denial 
adjudications.  
2. Applying Deference Jurisprudence to the Trademark Office’s 
Factual Determinations 
Until 1999, however, the Federal Circuit denied the applicability of the 
APA to the Trademark Office’s fact-findings altogether. Instead, the 
appellate court insisted that the “clearly erroneous” standard (the standard 
that typically governs the review of a district court’s fact-findings) 
governed review of the Agency’s factual findings—a standard that is less 
deferential than either of the standards enunciated in the APA.
181
 In 1999, 
the Supreme Court, in Zurko v. Dickinson, rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
contention and held that the APA does govern the Patent and Trademark 
Office’s decision-making.182 At issue in Zurko was the appropriate 
standard under which to review the factual determinations of the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences, which was later renamed the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board, not of the TTAB.
183
 While the BPAI, the patent 
counterpart to the TTAB, arguably conducted formal adjudication with 
respect to patent interferences, the vast majority of BPAI adjudications, 
including the adjudication of patent denials, were informal in nature.
184
 
Moreover, at issue in Zurko, and the cases discussed in-depth in this 
Subpart, was BPAI informal adjudication of patent denials.
185
 The 
Supreme Court in Zurko, however, did not specify which of the two 
standards outlined in the APA should be applied when reviewing the 
Patent Office’s factual determinations.186  
Because, as discussed below, the Federal Circuit held, without any 
analysis, the deference owed to the Trademark Office’s factual 
 
 
 181. In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1450 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that “clearly erroneous” is less 
deferential than the APA standards of review); see also In re Hacot-Colombier, 105 F.3d 616, 618 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying the clearly erroneous standard of review to TTAB fact-findings).  
 182. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999).  
 183. Id. at 153.  
 184. See Craig Allen Nard, Deference, Defiance, and the Useful Arts, 56 OHIO. ST. L.J. 1415, 
1434 (1995) (noting that Patent Office proceedings associated with patent denials are informal in 
nature); Wasserman, supra note 74, at 1974–75 (discussing the informal nature of Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board adjudications); see also supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.  
 185. Zurko, 527 U.S. at 165. 
 186. Id. 
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determinations is the same as the deference owed to the Patent Office’s 
factual determinations, understanding the reasoning behind the latter is 
critical in analyzing the former. As a result, I now turn to applying the 
standard administrative law principles to review of the Patent and 
Trademark Office’s fact-findings as well as critiquing In re Gartside, the 
case in which the Federal Circuit confronted the question of whether 
substantial evidence or the less deferential arbitrary or capricious standard 
governed the review of the Patent Office’s factual determinations.187  
The APA is structured so that § 706(2)(a) provides “arbitrary [or] 
capricious” review as a catch-all whereas § 706(2)(E) sets out the specific 
scenarios when the “substantial evidence” standard governs. Determining 
what standard should apply to the Patent Office’s decisions should have 
been relatively straightforward. Section 706(2)(E) states that substantial 
evidence applies in cases “subject to sections 556 and 557 of [the APA] or 
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.”188 Thus, § 706(2)(E) governs only formal proceedings—in other 
words, proceedings that resemble a civil judicial trial.
189
 The first half of 
§ 706(2)(E) would apply when the agency’s organic statute utilized the 
magic words in § 554 of “hearing” and “on a record,” which trigger the 
formal provisions outlined in § 556 and § 557 of the APA. The second half 
of § 706(2)(E) applies to formal hearings in which the organic statute did 
not utilize the triggering language of § 554 but instead listed within the 
statute itself the formal protections of § 556 and § 557 or similar trial-like 
protections.
190
 That is, it applies where the organic statute of an agency 
states that its adjudicatory obligation must be effectuated by, among other 
things, a neutral hearing officer who is prohibited from participating in ex 
parte communications and presides over the case and grants parties to the 
proceeding the right to conduct cross-examination of witnesses. Because 
the adjudications at issue both in Zurko v. Dickinson and In re Gartside 
were informal patent denials, the Federal Circuit should have found the 
substantial evidence standard was inapplicable and the more deferential 
“arbitrary [or] capricious” standard governed.191 
 
 
 187. In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 188. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), 706(2)(E) (2012).  
 189. Id. §§ 556–557.  
 190. One example of a statute requiring formal procedures would be rulemaking under the Clean 
Air Act, as Congress has required the Environmental Protection Agency to conduct what amounts to 
an evidentiary hearing. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2012).  
 191. The Patent Office recently obtained new adjudicatory authority which resembles formal 
adjudication. For an argument as to how this new authority anointed the Patent Office the primary 
interpreter of the Patent Act, see Wasserman, supra note 74, at 1959. 
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The Federal Circuit, however, had other ideas and managed to find the 
path of less deference.
192
 Although the court acknowledged in In re 
Gartside that the BPAI did not conduct formal proceedings under § 556 
and § 557 with respect to patent denials, it nevertheless found that the 
second half of 706(2)(E) governed. The Federal Circuit held that because 
one statutory provision of the Patent Act states that the Federal Circuit 
“shall review the decision from which an appeal is taken on the record 
before the Patent and Trademark Office”193 and another provision refers to 
appeals at the BPAI as being “heard,” and because only the BPAI has the 
authority to grant a “rehearing,” substantial evidence review was 
appropriate.
194
  
The Federal Circuit’s reasoning is troubling on several fronts.195 At a 
conceptual level, the appellate court’s analysis—its searching for “on the 
record” and “hearing” in the Patent Act—would have been more 
appropriate if the appellate court had determined the first half rather than 
the second half of § 706(2)(E) applied to the Patent Office’s fact-finding. 
That is, the court’s strained interpretation of the APA contravenes the 
standard understanding that “otherwise reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute” governs when an implementing 
statute requires the agency to conduct what amounts to an evidentiary 
hearing. Because the Patent Act did not contain any language requiring the 
BPAI to partake in an evidentiary hearing wherein parties cross-examine 
witnesses, object to evidence presented, or take advantage of any of the 
other protections that are typically associated with formal adjudication, the 
second half of § 706(2)(E) is inapplicable. 
Moreover, even considering the court’s analysis through the lens of the 
first half of § 706(2)(E), the Federal Circuit’s reasoning still misses the 
mark. Although the statutory provision of the Patent Act enumerating 
BPAI duties includes the authority to grant a “rehearing” and states that 
each appeal shall be “heard,” importantly, it does not utilize the word 
 
 
 192. Gartside, 203 F.3d at 1312. 
 193. Id. at 1313.  
 194. Id.  
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall, on written appeal of an applicant, 
review adverse decisions of examiners upon applications for patents . . . . Each appeal . . . 
shall be heard by at least three members of the Board, who shall be designated by the 
Director. Only the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences may grant rehearings.  
35 U.S.C. § 6 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 195. Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have criticized the reasoning of the Federal Circuit in In re 
Gartside and have made similar arguments as to why the appellate court’s analysis is flawed. See 
Benjamin & Rai, supra note 101, at 288–89.  
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“hearing.”196 While this may seem like semantics, the absence of the word 
“hearing” has been of utmost salience in the line of jurisprudence 
delineating the triggering language of formal proceedings—that is, § 556 
and § 557 of the APA.
197
 Courts have repeatedly held that if the statute 
does not utilize the word “hearing” to describe an agency’s adjudicatory 
obligations, then the agency is not required to effectuate those obligations 
through formal proceedings.
198
 Moreover, the “on the record” language the 
Federal Circuit cites is found in the statutory provision that governs the 
court’s review of the BPAI’s decisions, not in the provisions that 
enumerate the BPAI’s duties. That is, the “on the record” language does 
not support the contention that the BPAI itself may not consider any 
evidence that is not part of the record in making its determination. Thus, 
the first half of § 706(2)(E) also did not govern.
199
 Because the Patent Act 
did not compel the Patent Office to partake in formal adjudication or in an 
evidentiary type hearing, the governing standard should have been 
arbitrary or capricious review.  
Shortly thereafter, the Federal Circuit perpetuated the flawed reasoning 
in In re Gartside by holding, without any analysis, that the substantial 
evidence standard also applied to the Trademark Office’s factual 
determinations.
200
 In On-Line Careline v. America Online, the Federal 
Circuit provided an ex-post justification for its earlier decision to extend 
substantial evidence review to the TTAB’s factual determinations.201 The 
Federal Circuit’s analysis, however, was even less convincing than it was 
 
 
 196. Id.  
 197. See, e.g., Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872, 878 (1st Cir. 1978) 
(establishing the presumption that without congressional intent to the contrary, the statutory 
requirement of a hearing triggers the formal procedures in §§ 556–557); City of W. Chi. v. U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 701 F.2d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 1983) (establishing the presumption that 
when the statute required a hearing but lacked the “on the record” language, clear congressional 
“intent to trigger the formal, on-the-record hearing provision of the APA” must be present to require 
formal procedures); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(applying Chevron deference to an agency’s decision on whether the implementing statute that 
required a hearing required the agency to effectuate its adjudicatory obligations through formal 
proceedings).  
 198. Berry, supra note 113, at 552 (“[I]f the statute includes no references to hearings, then almost 
certainly formal procedures should not be required.”); see also Wasserman, supra note 74, at 1978–89 
(discussing the three different approaches circuit courts have taken when faced with an implementing 
statute that utilizes the word “hearing” but not “on the record” with respect to the trigger provisions of 
formal adjudication).  
 199. Furthermore, the “on the record” language that triggers the protections outlined in §§ 556–
557 of the APA is typically found in the statutory provision delineating the agencies’ adjudicatory 
obligations, not in the provision outlining the court’s review of the agency action. 
 200. Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“We uphold the Board’s 
factual findings unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence.”). 
 201. On-Line Careline, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 229 F.3d 1080, 1084–85 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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in the patent context. The appellate court continued to misconstrue the 
second half of § 706(2)(E) by suggesting that because the Lanham Act 
also required the court to “review the decision from which the appeal is 
taken on the record before the Patent and Trademark Office,”202 substantial 
evidence governed.
203
 However, in On-Line Careline, the appellate court 
did not discuss, or even acknowledge, that the word “hearing” or any word 
whose root was “hear” did not appear in the provisions of the Lanham Act 
that enumerated the TTAB’s duties.204 Thus, half of the key reason why 
the Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence governed the review of 
the Patent Office’s fact-findings was not present with respect to the 
Trademark Office.
205
  
Similar to the patent scenario, the determination of which APA 
standard governed the Trademark Office’s factual findings should have 
turned on the formality associated with the proceeding. This determination 
should have been relatively straightforward, at least with respect to 
Trademark Office fact-findings announced in the adjudication of 
trademark denials. The absence of the word “hearing” in the Trademark 
Office’s adjudicatory obligations associated with trademark denials 
suggests that Congress did not compel the Trademark Office to utilize 
formal adjudication, and hence the first half of § 706(2)(E) did not govern 
the fact-findings of the TTAB.
206
 Nothing in the Lanham Act suggests that 
 
 
 202. 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (2000). 
 203. On-Line Careline, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1084–85. 
 204. Id. The provision in the Lanham Act that describes TTAB review of trademark denials states 
that “[a]n appeal may be taken to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board from any final decision of the 
examiner in charge of the registration of marks upon the payment of the prescribed fee.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1070 (2000). The provision in the Lanham Act that describes the Trademark Office’s adjudicatory 
obligations regarding inter partes proceedings states that “[i]n every case of interference, opposition to 
registration, application to register as a lawful concurrent user, or application to cancel the registration 
of a mark, the Director shall give notice to all parties and shall direct a Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board to determine and decide the respective rights of registration. The Trademark Trial and Appeal 
Board shall include the Director, the Commissioner for Patents, the Commissioner for Trademarks, 
and administrative trademark judges who are appointed by the Director.” 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (2000).   
 205. See In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In addition, the appellate court 
appeared only to be providing a post-hoc rationalization for why the APA substantial evidence 
standard applied in lieu of the less deferential court/court standard, which the court had previously 
held applied to the BPAI, to the TTAB’s factual determinations. The court never appears to have 
considered what it has characterized as the more deferential APA standard of arbitrary and capricious 
as applied to the TTAB’s factual determinations. On-Line Careline, Inc., 229 F.3d at 1085 (noting that 
“[n]othing in these statutes suggests that the TTAB should receive any less deference on fact-finding 
than the BPAI”).  
 Note that if substantial evidence was appropriate for review of the Trademark Office’s factual 
findings, then it appears that the Agency was compelled to conduct formal adjudication. If that is the 
case, then the argument that the Agency’s legal determinations should be afforded Chevron deference 
is much stronger.  
 206. See supra note 170.  
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the TTAB must conduct what amounts to an evidentiary hearing wherein 
parties can present evidence and cross examine witness, among other 
things, when conducting a trademark registration denial proceeding.
207
 
Thus, the second half of § 706(2)(E) also did not apply. As a result, the 
Federal Circuit should have determined that the arbitrary and capricious 
standard governed review of the Trademark Office’s factual 
determinations announced during the adjudication of trademark denials.  
With respect to inter partes proceedings, or the adjudication of 
trademark registration grants, the analysis is arguably more nuanced. The 
Trademark Office utilizes formal adjudication to effectuate these 
proceedings, although it is unclear whether the Agency was compelled to 
do so or elected to utilize more formal proceedings than the Lanham Act 
required. If it was the former, then the second half of § 706(2)(E) would 
apply and substantial evidence would govern. If it was the latter, then the 
question becomes whether the Trademark Office’s election into more 
formal proceedings than the Lanham Act requires is sufficient to find that 
§ 706(2)(E) governs. Because the language of § 706(2)(E) states that 
substantial evidence is applied in cases “subject to sections 556 and 557 of 
[the APA] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute,”208 the plain text of statute suggests no. Courts that 
have confronted this very issue have held that substantial evidence is 
inappropriate.
209
 Thus, only if an agency is compelled to utilize formal 
proceedings should substantial evidence govern. As a result, to the extent 
the Lanham Act does not compel the Trademark Office to utilize formal 
procedures to effectuate inter partes proceedings, the Federal Circuit 
should have concluded that the more deferential standard of arbitrary and 
capricious applies for all TTAB proceedings. 
What about district courts? Unlike appeals directly to the Federal 
Circuit, TTAB decisions appealed to a district court are guaranteed a trial 
de novo wherein new evidence may be submitted. Similar to the 
Trademark Office’s legal determinations, this Subpart argues that 
determining the proper standard of review that a district court should 
 
 
 207. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1067, 1070.  
 208. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012) (emphasis added).  
 209. See Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265, 271 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that substantial 
evidence review was inappropriate because agency action at issue was excluded from the applications 
of sections 556 and 557 and “no other statute require[d] . . . th[e] agency . . . [to] hold a hearing on the 
record, though . . . regulations [did]”); Wroblaski v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 852 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding 
that where the Civil Service Commission engaged in a hearing pursuant to a regulation, but not 
pursuant to a statute, the substantial evidence standard under 706(2)(E) was inapplicable). 
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afford the TTAB’s factual determinations ought to depend on whether new 
evidence was submitted to the district court.  
If new evidence is submitted, recent case law suggests that the district 
court should afford no deference to any of the factual determinations made 
by the Trademark Office. That is, the Supreme Court in Kappos v. Hyatt 
considered the proper standard of review that should govern the Patent 
Office’s fact-findings in a civil action before a district court where new 
evidence was submitted.
210
 The Court held that if new evidence is 
presented on a disputed question of fact, the district court must make de 
novo factual findings that take account of both the new evidence and 
factual determinations made by the Patent Office.
211
 The Court, however, 
stated that district courts are free to determine, within their discretion, the 
weight to be given to the new evidence.
212
 Because of the statutory 
similarities between the trial de novo guaranteed by the Patent Act and by 
the Lanham Act, there is little reason to believe that Hyatt does not control 
in the trademark context. In fact, the one circuit that has confronted this 
issue, the Fourth, has ruled as such.
213
 Alternatively, if no new evidence is 
submitted, there is still the possibility that the TTAB’s fact-finding may 
warrant deference.
214
 In this circumstance, the district court’s role is nearly 
identical to that of the Federal Circuit’s—review of facts found by the 
Trademark Office—and hence arguably the same standards should govern 
review of the TTAB’s factual determinations.  
Similar to legal determinations, a circuit split exists as to the proper 
deference owed to the Trademark Office’s factual findings. Some circuits 
apply de novo review of all evidence without regard to whether it was 
originally before the Trademark Office,
215
 others apply a “thorough 
conviction standard” to the new evidence,216 while still others review new 
 
 
 210. Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1694–95 (2012). 
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. 
 213. Swatch AG v. Beehive Wholesale, LLC, 739 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 214. The Federal Circuit has held as such in the patent context. Hyatt, 625 F.3d at 1336 (“[I]t is 
well settled that a reviewing court must apply the APA’s court/agency standard of review to Patent 
Office fact-findings when no new evidence is admitted in a [civil action].”).  
 215. See Standard Oil Co. v. Osage Oil & Transp. Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1554, 1556 (N.D. Okla. 
1988) (“[W]hen ‘new evidence is presented to the district court on a disputed fact question . . . a de 
novo finding will be necessary to take such evidence into account together with the evidence before 
the [B]oard.’”); Consolidated Cosmetics v. Neilson Chem. Co., 109 F. Supp. 300, 307–08 (E.D. Mich. 
1952) (“The present case . . . is an independent action in which the questions are tried de novo, upon 
all the evidence, new and old.”).  
 216. See Material Supply Int’l, Inc. v. Sunmatch Indus. Co., 146 F.3d 983, 989–90 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (quoting 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 21:21, at 21–26 (4th ed. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[F]indings of fact made by the 
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evidence de novo and evidence before the TTAB under a deferential 
standard of substantial evidence.
217
 For the reasons stated above, this 
Article argues this is wrong as a matter of doctrine, at least with respect to 
the review of patent registration denials. Nevertheless, because Hyatt was 
recently decided at the time this Article was written, the extent to which 
district courts and their respective circuits will find Hyatt controlling and 
if these courts will apply Hyatt even when no new evidence is submitted 
remains to be seen. 
In summary, this Subpart argued that the Federal Circuit currently fails 
to afford the Trademark Office’s factual determinations sufficient 
deference. More specifically, it contends the Federal Circuit should be 
applying the more deferential standard of arbitrary or capricious when 
reviewing the Trademark Office’s fact-findings announced during the 
TTAB’s adjudication of trademark denials. In contrast, the deference owed 
to the Agency’s fact-findings in inter partes proceedings depends upon 
whether the Trademark Office was compelled to effectuate these 
proceedings through formal adjudication. If Congress intended the Agency 
to utilize formal adjudication when conducting inter partes proceedings, 
then the arbitrary or capricious standard should govern. If the Agency 
elected to utilize more formal proceedings than the Lanham Act required, 
the Federal Circuit is correct that substantial evidence is appropriate. 
Additionally, this Subpart argued that the deference a district court should 
afford the TTAB’s factual findings depends on whether new evidence on a 
disputed fact is submitted. If new evidence is submitted to the district 
court, then Hyatt is likely to control and de novo review is appropriate. If 
no new evidence is submitted, then the district court plays a role similar to 
the Federal Circuit’s, and arguably the same standards should govern its 
review of the TTAB’s fact-findings.   
 
 
[TTAB] are given great weight and not upset unless new evidence is introduced which carries 
thorough conviction.”); see also Coach House Rest., Inc. v. Coach & Six Rests., Inc., 934 F.2d 1551, 
1557 (11th Cir. 1991); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Stagecoach Props., Inc., 685 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 
1982); Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Texas Pharmacal Co., 335 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1964); Wilson Jones 
Co. v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1964); Century Distilling Co. v. Cont’l 
Distilling Co., 106 F.2d 486, 489 (3d Cir. 1939). 
 217. See CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Eng’g, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 675 & n.9 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying 
the substantial evidence standard of review to the TTAB’s factual findings and for summary judgment 
purposes reviewing new evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party). Notably, the 
Seventh Circuit explicitly endorsed the Federal Circuit’s reasoning when it concluded that substantial 
evidence governed its review of fact-finding by the TTAB. Id. at 675–76. 
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D. Do the Standards of Review Really Matter? 
Although theoretically the probability that agency action will be upheld 
should vary depending on the standard of review applied, do the standards 
of review really matter in practice? One might argue that a court that is 
hesitant to cede power to an agency may state that it is applying the 
relevant standard but fail to afford proper deference associated with that 
standard.
218
 Is there any evidence that the standards of review affect the 
outcomes of judicial review proceedings? 
To begin, there is a growing body of empirical studies that examine the 
relevance of the standard of review to judicial decision-making. The 
results, however, are mixed. Some studies suggest that a more deferential 
standard of review corresponds to higher affirmance rates for agencies,
219
 
while others find only a weak association between review standard and 
agency win rates.
220
 The study that is most on point is that of Stuart 
Benjamin and Arti Rai, who examined whether changing the standard of 
deference from clearly erroneous (pre-Zurko) to the more deferential 
substantial evidence (post-Gartside) affected the Federal Circuit’s review 
of the Patent Office’s fact-findings.221 Benjamin and Rai reported that for 
their sample of cases, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Patent Office’s fact-
 
 
 218. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980–
84 (1992) (arguing that empirical evidence of Supreme Court decision-making immediately after the 
Chevron decision suggests that the Justices continued to apply the less deferential, pre-Chevron factors 
to cases). Alternatively, a reviewing court may improperly categorize agency action so that less 
deference is owed. See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 101, at 331 (discussing how the Federal 
Circuit “on at least four occasions following the Supreme Court’s decision in Zurko . . . appeared to 
evade deference by recasting [a] [patent] appeal on a factual question into a determination of claim 
construction (which according to the court is an issue of law to be reviewed de novo).”).  
 219. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 
1091 (2008) (finding “some positive correlation” with the application of Chevron deference and high 
agency win rates); Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study 
of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1030 & tbl.3 (analyzing decisions by the courts 
of appeals that document a pre-Chevron affirmance rate of 71% versus a post-Chevron rate of 81%).  
 220. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions 
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85–86 (2011) (finding that standards of review have “little if any 
explanatory value” because agency action is typically upheld at approximately the same rate, 
regardless of the standard of review applied); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 
135, 136–37 (2010) (arguing that the standards of review do not matter in practice because, in part, of 
his findings that courts uphold agency action at approximately the same rate regardless of the standard 
of review applied); Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 679, 718–20 (2002) (noting that, of the three standards of review studied, only one 
supported the proposition that there is a positive correlation between agency wins and the stringency of 
the standard of review). 
 221. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 101, at 332. 
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findings 67% of the time pre-Zurko and 81% of the time post-Gartside.
222
 
Thus, the authors concluded that the change in standard has had some 
impact on the Federal Circuit’s decision-making, although they are careful 
not to make any strong conclusions given, among other limitations, their 
small sample size.
223
  
It is, however, difficult to know just what to make of these empirical 
studies, as many suffer from a series of selection biases that limit the 
causal inferences drawn from them.
224
 Because these analyses fail to, 
among other things, take into account how the underlying population of 
cases that are appealed may differ across the standards of review, using 
them as the basis for any conclusion as to the effect of standards of review 
on judicial decision-making would likely be premature. Nevertheless, 
judges repeatedly state that the standards of review affect their decision-
making. The judges of the Federal Circuit have repeatedly expressed the 
view that deference standards have a significant impact on the case’s 
outcome.
225
 Even legal realists, like Judge Richard Posner, have noted the 
substantial difference in how a judge approaches review under strong 
judicial deference versus no deference.
226
 Although it is inevitable that 
courts will from time to time skirt the proper application of a deference 
standard, it is important to keep in mind that the point is not whether 
 
 
 222. Id. at 333.  
 223. Id. 
 224. In order to determine whether a standard of review influences the judicial process, ideally 
one would want to observe if the court’s decision to uphold the agency’s legal interpretation varied as 
the standard of review changed. Of course, such counterfactuals do not exist in our legal system; the 
same case is not tried across multiple appellate courts that have been randomly assigned different 
standards of review. Selection biases in affirmance rate studies may confound the conclusions that can 
be drawn from them. First, the set of an agency’s legal interpretations that are afforded de novo review 
likely vary substantially from those that are eligible for Chevron deference. As discussed above, de 
novo review is appropriate when an agency is interpreting a legal provision that it has no special 
authority to administer, such as the Constitution. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. There 
may be something inherently different in reviewing the construction of the Constitution than 
reexamining an agency’s legal interpretation of its organic act that may skew the results. Second, the 
standard of review applied can affect a potential litigant’s decision to appeal the agency’s legal 
interpretation in the first place. If the potential litigant believes her chance of winning an appeal is 
inversely related to the strength of the deference afforded the agency’s decision, then she may choose 
not to appeal marginal cases when a strong deference standard will be applied. As a result, the reversal 
rate of agency action that is afforded Chevron deference may be arbitrarily high, as litigants choose 
only to appeal cases where the agency seems clearly to have adopted an interpretation that was 
unreasonable. Thus, even if affirmance rate studies suggest there is only a weak association between 
review standards and agency win rates, the standards of review may still have a significant impact 
upon judicial decision-making. To be clear, often the authors of these studies acknowledge these 
limitations. See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 101, at 333. 
 225. Michel, supra note 6, at *8 (“One of my main messages to you is that standards of review 
influence dispositions in the Federal Circuit far more than many advocates realize.”). 
 226. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 113–14 (2008). 
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courts ever improperly apply a standard of review, but whether, on looking 
at the totality of cases, the standard of deference has some bearing on the 
likelihood that a case will be upheld.  
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TRADEMARK OFFICE’S ELEVATED ROLE ON 
FEDERAL COURTS’ VALIDITY DETERMINATIONS 
The application of administrative law principles to TTAB proceedings 
undoubtedly results in elevating the role of the Trademark Office in the 
trademark system. At a minimum, the Agency’s legal and factual 
determinations should, all else being equal, be upheld at a higher rate. This 
Part pushes beyond this initial implication and explores the extent to 
which the Trademark Office will play a greater role in shaping the 
substantive standards of trademark law outside the registration context. 
That is, to what extent will the Trademark Office’s legal constructions of 
the Lanham Act also influence the development of the validity doctrines 
applied by federal courts during trademark infringement suits? The answer 
to this question will depend on the level of deference afforded the 
Agency’s legal constructions of ambiguous terms of the Lanham Act.  
If, for instance, Skidmore deference is owed to the Trademark Office’s 
legal determinations, the Agency may affect the development of 
substantive standards when federal courts are making validity 
determinations in at least two ways. First, the Trademark Office, as it does 
now, may informally influence the decision-making of courts during 
trademark validity determinations—that is, during an infringement suit 
rather than during an appeal of registration determination. That is, to the 
extent any federal court has already addressed the legal issue during a 
registration context, that precedent could be influential in a trademark 
validity determination. Imagine that whether product configuration can 
qualify for trademark protection is an unsettled legal issue and that the 
Trademark Office decides this legal issue in the affirmative in a TTAB 
proceeding before a district court is faced with such a decision. Also 
imagine the Agency’s decision is appealed to and upheld by the Federal 
Circuit under Skidmore deference. District courts and regional circuits that 
are subsequently confronted with whether product configuration should 
qualify for trademark protection during validity litigation may find the 
Federal Circuit’s and TTAB’s reasoning persuasive and hold that product 
configuration can qualify for trademark protection.  
Second, the Trademark Office can more directly influence the 
development of substantive standards of trademark law during validity 
determinations. This scenario occurs when an appellate court has already 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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addressed the legal issue in the registration context and the same legal 
issue subsequently arises during trademark validity litigation decided by a 
court within the federal judicial circuit of the appellate court.
227
 Imagine 
again that whether product configuration can qualify for trademark 
protection is an unsettled legal issue and that the Trademark Office 
decides this legal issue in the affirmative in a TTAB proceeding before a 
district court is faced with such a decision. Now consider that the TTAB’s 
decision is initially appealed to the US District Court for the Southern 
District of New York and then to the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, wherein the latter upheld the Trademark Office’s legal 
determination under Skidmore deference. A district court within the 
federal jurisdiction of the Second Circuit that is later faced with the issue 
of whether product configuration can qualify for trademark protection in a 
trademark infringement suit is bound by Second Circuit decisions, as are 
later Second Circuit panels.
228
  
The Trademark Office’s role in shaping the substantive standards that 
are applied in trademark litigation will even be greater if its legal decisions 
are afforded Chevron deference. In this scenario, the Agency’s legal 
determinations announced during TTAB proceedings will carry the force 
of law.
229
 Thus, the Agency would be able to informally and directly 
influence the development of trademark validity doctrines as described 
above for the Skidmore scenario. There is, however, at least one additional 
way in which the Trademark Office’s role in the development of 
substantive trademark validity standards would be enhanced. The 
reviewing court of the Agency may be bound by the Trademark Office’s 
legal interpretation of an ambiguous term of the Lanham Act even in the 
face of contrary judicial precedent. Thus, even if a federal court has 
interpreted an ambiguous term of the Lanham Act before the Trademark 
Office, the court must defer to the Trademark Office’s legal construction 
as long as the Agency’s interpretation is reasonable pursuant to the 
 
 
 227. As discussed in Part II.B, if new evidence is submitted to the district court on a disputed 
question of fact and this new evidence is relevant to the TTAB’s legal determination, then the court 
should afford the Agency’s legal decision no deference. Thus, it is only when no new evidence is 
submitted to a disputed question of fact or when the submitted new evidence is irrelevant to the 
TTAB’s legal determination that deference should be afforded the Agency’s legal decision. As a 
result, only this latter scenario is at issue in this Part.  
 228. While it is conceivable that a later court may try to distinguish the prior ruling that the 
subsequent case arises in litigation and not registration context, historically, federal courts do not 
distinguish trademark validity doctrines in the registration and litigation context.  
 229. See supra Part II.B. 
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Supreme Court’s decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n 
v. Brand X Internet Services.
230
     
Finally, it should be noted that although the Trademark Office’s role in 
crafting substantive trademark law would be greatly elevated if the 
Agency’s legal determinations were afforded deference, the federal courts 
would continue to play a critical role in the development of trademark law 
in at least three ways. First, the federal courts would review the fruits of 
TTAB review proceedings. In this role, if Chevron deference were 
applicable, courts would continue to shape substantive trademark law by 
determining both whether the relevant language of the Lanham Act was 
ambiguous, and if so, whether the Trademark Office’s interpretation of 
that language was reasonable. If Skidmore deference were warranted, 
courts would continue to influence substantive trademark law by 
determining if the TTAB’s legal determinations were convincing. Second, 
the courts would also continue to play a significant role interpreting 
trademark law during validity disputes, although that role would be more 
circumscribed than it is presently. If, for example, litigants raise an issue 
that had been directly addressed by the Trademark Office during a TTAB 
proceeding and the reviewing court upheld that interpretation, a 
subsequent court in the same jurisdiction would apply the Trademark 
Office’s determination without further interpretation. However, if a party 
raises a challenge to the validity of a trademark that implicates an 
ambiguity in the Trademark Office’s interpretation or raises a question of 
first impression, the federal courts would continue to decide in the first 
instance what the appropriate legal standard should be. Third, the federal 
courts would remain the primary interpreters of the sections of the Lanham 
Act that are directed towards infringement and damages—standards the 
Trademark Office would not address during a registration determination.  
 
 
 230. 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005). It is also conceivable that granting the Trademark Office 
Chevron deference for its legal constructions of ambiguous terms of the Lanham Act could result in 
the Agency announcing substantive trademark law standards that govern the entire nation, bringing 
uniformity to the trademark standards across the regional circuits. That is, to the extent any federal 
court upholds the Agency’s legal construction of an ambiguous term of the Lanham Act under 
Chevron, any subsequent court that considers the same legal issue may feel compelled to follow the 
earlier court’s holding, even if the earlier court is subject to a different federal jurisdiction than the 
subsequent court.  
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IV. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR DEFERENCE: COMPARATIVE 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS  
So far, this Article has principally focused on the analytical question of 
how existing administrative law principles should apply to the judicial 
review of the Trademark Office’s decision-making. Part II argued that the 
Federal Circuit affords less deference to the Trademark Office’s legal and 
factual determinations than standard administrative law principles dictate, 
while Part III explored the elevated role the Agency would play in the 
trademark system if the Trademark Office’s decisions were afforded more 
deference. While this account will provide courts and policymakers with 
guidance and is valuable in its own right, it does not address the normative 
question of how the institutional relationship between the Trademark 
Office and the federal courts should be structured. This Part begins this 
normative inquiry, taking as its baseline the principal goal of the 
trademark system—minimizing consumer search costs by enabling the 
public to easily identify a particular product from a particular source 
without unduly restricting orderly competition within the marketplace.
231
 
To guide this analysis, I draw on the large and growing body of literature 
on the topic of comparative institutional competence.
232
 Moreover, this 
Part continues to focus particularly on the Federal Circuit, rather than the 
regional circuits. This Part does not purport to elucidate the ideal 
institutional arrangement between courts and agencies. Instead, the 
following discussion compares the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Office with respect to the two 
canonical institutional design considerations: expertise and avoidance of 
capture or bias.  
A. Expertise 
This Subpart argues that the Trademark Office has a comparative 
institutional advantage in crafting substantive trademark doctrine to 
effectuate trademark law’s principal goal.233 But before making this 
 
 
 231. See supra note 21. 
 232. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); HENRY 
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); DONALD L. 
HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 22–67 (1977); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003). 
 233. I have made similar arguments with respect to the Patent Office. See Wasserman, supra note 
74.  
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argument, it begins by establishing the type of expertise needed to craft 
substantive trademark validity standards to reduce consumer search costs 
without unduly restricting orderly competition within the marketplace. 
The ordinary consumer’s mindset is central to trademark law and 
policy. Trademarks exist only to the extent that consumers perceive them 
as designations of source. The scope of protection afforded to the 
trademark holder turns on whether consumers perceive one trademark as 
referring to the source of another. Yet there is near universal agreement 
that, to date, trademark jurisprudence has evolved on the basis of judicial 
intuitions and subjective stereotypes rather than persuasive evidence 
concerning consumer behavior.
234
 As a result, scholars generally accept 
that fields providing insight into consumer behavior—such as consumer 
psychology, the study of consumers and their behavior—can provide 
valuable information as to how the doctrines of trademark law should be 
crafted to promote the normative goals of the trademark system.
235
  
Take for instance trademark distinctiveness, the key factual issue in 
assessing whether a mark is protectable and the scope associated with that 
protection. For word marks, the law has long embraced a taxonomy—
established in Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World—that determines 
protectability on the basis of a word’s classification as “(1) generic, 
(2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary[,] or [(5)] fanciful.”236 Words 
that fall into the last three categories are assumed to be protectable on the 
basis of an assumption about consumer perception of their distinctiveness: 
 
 
 234. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Holt, 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1101, 1105 (T.T.A.B. 2009) (stating 
that the determination of which inherent distinctiveness category a mark belongs to is “often made on 
an intuitive basis rather than a result of precisely logical analysis”); Ann Bartow, Likelihood of 
Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 723, 772 (2004) (lamenting that trademark law has evolved on 
the basis of “personal intuition and subjective, internalized stereotypes,” not on “specific and 
persuasive evidence about consumer behavior.”); Thomas R. Lee, Glenn L. Christensen & Eric D. 
DeRosia, Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575, 
649 (2008) (“Trademark law is far too dependent on assumptions about consumer behavior to continue 
to evolve in ignorance of an entire body of scholarship devoted to that very subject.”).  
 235. Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary Meaning, 
Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 1013, 1014 (2001).  
 236. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–10 (2d Cir. 1976). The 
taxonomy set out in Abercrombie has been repeatedly endorsed by the Supreme Court as establishing 
the governing framework for trademark distinctiveness under federal law. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) (embracing “the now-classic test originally formulated 
by Judge Friendly”); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995) (citing 
Abercrombie for the proposition that “‘fanciful,’ ‘arbitrary,’ or ‘suggestive’ words or designs . . . 
almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand”); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 
505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (approving of the “classic formulation set out by Judge Friendly” in 
Abercrombie).  
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they “almost automatically tell a customer that they refer to a brand.”237 In 
contrast, words that fall in the second category (descriptive) are denied 
such presumed protection on the basis of a contrary assumption about 
consumer perception of their distinctiveness: that they describe a 
characteristic or quality of the product to which they are attached and thus 
would not be perceived automatically as source indicators. Courts 
overwhelmingly rely upon “subjective” and “intuitive” determinations 
when categorizing marks along the distinctiveness spectrum.
238
 Consumer 
psychology could provide insight into the law’s longstanding assumptions 
about consumer perception of word marks that could lead to the 
modification of this spectrum while also providing guidance as to how to 
classify marks along the spectrum. Studies to date have called into 
question the legitimacy of this spectrum, suggesting that descriptive marks 
are no less source-indicating than are suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful 
marks.
239
  
Similarly, despite the central role that consumer sophistication plays in 
trademark outcomes, a divide exists as to whether the average consumer is 
highly susceptible to even the slightest suggestion of a connection between 
two trademarks or instead is an informed sovereign whose “degree of 
confusion [she is] actually likely to suffer is less than might otherwise be 
thought.”240 Consumer psychology and consumer perception data could 
provide substantial guidance as to what conditions may affect the attention 
that can be expected to be given to a particular purchase.
241
 By better 
defining the sophistication of the consumer, these fields could help craft 
the doctrines of substantive trademark law to better effectuate decreasing 
consumer search costs.  
 
 
 237. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 162–63.  
 238. Lee, Christensen & DeRosia, supra note 234, at 577 (developing a model of consumer 
sophistication based on marketing and consumer psychology literature). 
 239. Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia & Glenn L. Christensen, An Empirical and Consumer 
Psychology Analysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1033 (2009); see also Jake 
Linford, The False Dichotomy Between Suggestive and Descriptive Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1367 (2015) (arguing that cognitive and historical research into language change suggests that 
protecting suggestive marks without secondary meaning is unfounded).  
 240. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying 
Rent? Deconstructing the Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 123, 154 
(1996); see also Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 
2042 (2005) (discussing the disagreement among trademark commentators on the average 
sophistication of a consumer). Compare Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 284 (assuming a relatively 
low level of consumer sophistication), with Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE 
L.J. 759, 789 (1990) (“Consumers may be more sophisticated than the Landes and Posner model 
assumes.”).  
 241. Lee, Christensen & DeRosia, supra note 234, at 577 (developing a model of consumer 
sophistication based on marketing and consumer psychology literature).  
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However, it is also important to keep in mind that trademark law seeks 
to minimize consumer search costs against overly restricting competition 
in the marketplace.
242
 If trademark protection becomes too strong, then 
orderly competition in the market—competition whereby one firm does 
not inappropriately take advantage of another firm’s brand—may be 
severely diminished.
243
 At this point, trademarks may no longer serve as 
socially useful devices because their economic costs could swamp the 
informational efficiency gains associated with utilizing symbols to identify 
products. As a result, understanding how to craft the doctrines of 
trademark law to reduce consumer search costs must be balanced against 
overly restricting marketplace competition. Thus, economic expertise with 
respect to competition within markets is also useful in crafting substantive 
trademark standards to promote the normative goals of the trademark 
system. 
Therefore, the institution charged with creating sound trademark policy 
needs access both to consumer perception and economic data, as well as 
sufficient expertise to analyze and interpret this information. Although one 
of the conclusions of the comparative institutional literature is that 
agencies’ information-gathering procedures and expertise are superior to 
courts,
244
 the semi-specialization of the Federal Circuit casts doubt on 
whether this norm should extend to the trademark system. Even taking 
into consideration the Federal Circuit’s semi-specialization, this Subpart 
concludes that the Trademark Office is still more likely than the Federal 
Circuit to possess the characteristics necessary to adjust the trademark 
standards towards optimally balancing reducing consumer search costs 
against overly restricting competition. More specifically, this Subpart 
concludes that although the Trademark Office is not currently optimally 
structured to perform this role, it, unlike the Federal Circuit, could be 
transformed into an institution that could conceivably perform this 
function. That is, the Trademark Office could grow and restructure its 
trademark policy division to perform robust data gathering and data 
analysis that would guide the development of guidelines demarcating how 
substantive trademark doctrines should be crafted to better effectuate the 
goal of trademarks. Trademark examining attorneys and TTAB judges 
could then rely upon these guidelines in making their registration 
determinations.  
 
 
 242. See WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 16, at 83, 93.  
 243. Id. at 94. 
 244. See Louis L. Jaffe, James Landis and the Administrative Process, 78 HARV. L. REV. 319, 324 
(1964); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 2079. 
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To begin, the Trademark Office generally possesses superior 
mechanisms to gather information necessary to make informed trademark 
policy decisions. The agency conducts hearings and roundtable 
discussions,
245
 partakes in research studies,
246
 and works closely with other 
expert federal agencies. The Trademark Office also routinely engages in 
rulemaking procedures that are specifically designed to encourage 
interested parties to communicate relevant viewpoints and information to 
the Agency.
247
 Admittedly, the Trademark Office would need to expand 
this host of information-gathering techniques and rely upon them more 
heavily to collect the consumer perception and economic data necessary to 
craft substantive trademark law which in turn will better promote the goals 
of the trademark system. The point is not that the Trademark Office, as 
currently structured, is optimally suited to performing this task, but instead 
that the Agency could conceivably be further transformed into an 
institution that could conceivably perform robust data gathering.  
In contrast, the Federal Circuit, like all appellate courts, is limited to 
the record developed by interested parties.
248
 Litigants, of course, can 
present expert witnesses and survey evidence that provide courts with 
some consumer behavior information. Nevertheless, it is generally thought 
that this information is biased towards the retaining party, diminishing the 
value of this information in the first instance.
249
 As a result, it is not too 
 
 
 245. For instance, the Trademark Office has held public hearings on Official Insignia of Native 
American Tribes, Public Hearings, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
patent/laws-and-regulations/public-hearings (last modified Aug. 1, 2007), and roundtable discussions 
on ensuring the accuracy and integrity of the trademark register as well as amendments to 
identifications of goods and services due to technological evolution. Initiatives and Events, U.S. 
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/trademark/trademark-updates-and-
announcements/initiatives-and-events (last modified Aug. 25, 2015). 
 246. The Trademark Office has studied a host of trademark-policy issues, including trademark 
litigation tactics and federal government services to protect trademarks and prevent counterfeiting, 
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: TRADEMARK LITIGATION TACTICS AND FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES TO PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND PREVENT COUNTERFEITING (2011), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/ip/TMLitigationReport_final_2011April27.pdf, and post 
registration proof of use. Initiatives and Events, supra note 245. Moreover, the Office of the Chief 
Economist at the Patent and Trademark Office includes within its research agenda “researching the 
economics of trademarks and trademark examination” and “analyzing the role that IP plays in the 
markets for technology and knowledge.” Research Agenda, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
http://www.uspto.gov/about-us/organizational-offices/office-policy-and-international-affairs/office-chief-
economist-1 (last modified Aug. 28, 2013). 
 247. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
(TMEP), CHAPTER 800—APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS (2014).  
 248. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A 
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 10–17 (1986).  
 249. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[C]onsumer 
surveys . . . are . . . not immune to manipulation.”). 
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surprising that empirical studies of trademark disputes find that judges 
tend to ignore consumer perception evidence altogether.
250
 While courts 
have some make-shift mechanisms to augment their access to information, 
these approaches tend to be poor substitutes for the information-gathering 
powers of agencies.
251
 For instance, while the Federal Circuit routinely 
considers amicus curiae briefs, the appellate court is still dependent on the 
briefs containing the information necessary to adjust the standards of 
trademark law to promote the normative goals of the system. If such 
information is not submitted, the Federal Circuit cannot, unlike the 
Trademark Office, order its own fact-findings to make up for the 
insufficiency.
252
  
However, even assuming that the Federal Circuit had the same access 
to consumer perception and economic data as the Trademark Office did, 
there is little reason to believe that its ability to analyze and understand 
this information surpasses that of the Trademark Office. None of the 
Federal Circuit judges or their personnel are trained in fields of consumer 
behavior or economics.
253
 Thus, even if economic or consumer perception 
data was provided to the court through some means, it is highly unlikely 
that judges could evaluate the merits of such studies. This may be 
especially true when conflicting studies are submitted. It is well known 
that judges struggle to evaluate survey methodology, especially when 
confronted with dueling expert testimony.
254
 It is also unlikely that judges 
would be able to fully appreciate the limitations on the conclusions that 
can be drawn from these empirical studies on consumer perception or 
economic data more generally—for example, is the study that finds 
students do not find descriptive marks any more source identifying than 
 
 
 250. See, e.g., Beebe, supra note 99, at 1641 (finding that “the conventional view of the utility of 
survey evidence may be incorrect” as only twenty percent of the cases in his sample addressed survey 
evidence, ten percent credited survey evidence, and seven percent ruled in favor of the outcome that 
the credited survey evidence favored); cf. Peter Weiss, The Use of Survey Evidence in Trademark 
Litigation: Science, Art or Confidence Game?, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 71, 83 (1990) (“[A] reading of 
the many cases in which either great weight or little weight was given to survey evidence will, I feel 
reasonably certain, lead most objective analysts to the conclusion that, while some surveys went down 
because they were indeed ‘seriously flawed,’ many others either stayed up or went down depending on 
the result which the judges wanted to reach . . . .”).  
 251. See, e.g., Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1786–87 
(2011).  
 252. Id. at 1787. 
 253. See Judges, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc. 
uscourts.gov/judges (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). 
 254. Bone, supra note 24, at 2131 (footnotes omitted) (“Consumer surveys are the best evidence 
of secondary meaning, but surveys are difficult to design properly . . . . Judges also find it difficult to 
evaluate survey methodology, especially when confronted with competing expert testimony, and this 
increases the likelihood of error.”).  
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fanciful marks generalizable to all trademark disputes or only some 
subset?
255
  
Finally, the Federal Circuit has shown little interest in developing 
policy expertise,
256
 even though the court’s jurisprudence has been 
routinely criticized for being overly formalistic and failing to engage with 
policy.
257
 The appellate court’s hesitancy to explicitly embrace a 
policymaking function is to some extent understandable. Judicial decision-
making norms arguably counsel against unequivocal policy 
pronouncements. Yet, it remains difficult to understand the court’s role, 
especially when deciding the meaning of an ambiguous term in the 
Lanham Act, as not involving at some level a policy determination.  
Notably, in contrast to courts, agencies are expressly charged with 
making policy and weighing the costs and benefits of competing 
outcomes. Such explicit authority enables agencies to more fully embrace 
a policymaking function—that is, making discretionary judgments based 
on a range of competing options. However, even with such intellectual 
freedom, the Trademark Office has historically lacked robust economic 
and consumer psychology expertise that it needs to make informed 
trademark policy decisions. Unlike other agencies that specialize in 
protecting consumer behavior, the Trademark Office has never employed a 
large number of policy-oriented thinkers, economists, or consumer 
psychologists. This would undoubtedly need to be rectified before the 
Agency could tailor trademark standards to effectuate the normative goals 
of the trademark system. Nevertheless, the Agency has recently attempted 
to rectify this shortcoming. In 2010, the Trademark Office created an 
Office of the Chief Economist,
258
 which has had an immediate impact on 
the Agency’s decision-making.259  
 
 
 255. See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 
TEX. L. REV. 507, 508 (2008) (raising some concerns about “empirical and normative flaws in the 
cognitive theory” employed “to fill [trademark] dilution[] [law’s] theoretical vacuum”).  
 256. Many of its judges flatly refute that the Federal Circuit engages in any sort of policymaking. 
Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent 
System, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 395, 398 & n.6 (2011) (“[Federal Circuit] judges insist that they do not 
‘make policy’ but instead decide disputes between parties . . . .”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the 
Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—and Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 803 & 
n.70 (2010). 
 257. John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 773–75 (2003). 
 258. Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/ 
about-us/organizational-offices/office-policy-and-international-affairs/office-chief-economist-6 (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
 259. For example, the Patent and Trademark Office’s recent rules regarding its fees were based on 
economic modeling. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, DETAILED 
APPENDICES: PATENT FEE PROPOSAL (2012). But see Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 DUKE 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/7
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Finally, there are reasons to believe that the Trademark Office may 
have the financial means to support a robust policy group. Recent 
legislation granted the Agency, for the first time, fee-setting authority.
260
 
This authority should enable the Trademark Office to raise funds to cover 
the additional personnel necessary to create a robust policy apparatus at 
the Agency. While the institutional design of the Trademark Office is 
currently suboptimal for promoting trademark policy, the Agency, unlike 
the Federal Circuit, has the potential to become an institution that could 
make informed, evidence-driven decisions on how to craft substantive 
trademark standards to effectuate the systems’ underlying goals.  
B. Capture and Institutional Bias 
Even though expertise may give rise to distinctive advantages with 
respect to institutional competence, specialization also has associated 
drawbacks—most saliently, the potential of “capture.” An institution’s 
repeated interaction with a narrow set of right holders may result in at least 
two pathologies. First, an institution may develop “tunnel vision,” 
pursuing its own technocratic viewpoints without sufficient regard for 
larger normative concerns.
261
 Second, a set of constituents may directly 
capture an institution. The latter concern stems from the observation that 
concentrated, well-financed groups are more likely than diffuse, less 
organized entities to influence decision makers.
262
 The result in either 
situation is that the institution will systematically make decisions that 
favor the interests of a narrow set of constituents over those of the general 
public.  
The concerns associated with capture theory are most frequently 
attributed to agencies whose repeated interactions with their regulatory 
constituents could lead to distortions in the agencies’ decision-making. 
More recently, this theory’s application has been expanded to include the 
judiciary, as scholars observed that the adjudicative process is also 
 
 
L.J. 1701 (2016) (criticizing the Patent and Trademark Office’s cost-benefit analysis of its fee-setting 
rules).  
 260. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316–20 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 261. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 11–19 (1993). 
 262. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS 53–57, 132–34 (1971); Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More 
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 32 (1991). 
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susceptible to the influence of interest groups.
263
 Of course, beyond 
capture concerns, other institutional structures may exist that also 
systematically bias the organization’s decision-making. Although these 
influences may not be directly related to expertise, any bias in an 
institution’s decisional process is concerning—whether the institution is a 
court or an agency. 
In comparison to its patent counterpart, the Trademark Office has been 
subjected to far fewer charges of institutional bias. More generally, the 
Trademark Office has not been thought of as being structured to favor the 
registration of trademarks. For instance, in contrast to patents, the fee 
structure associated with trademarks is better aligned to cover the costs 
associated with examining trademark applications.
264
 In the fiscal year of 
2014, the Patent Office garnered close to sixty percent of its budget 
through fees it only collected if it granted patents.
265
 In contrast, the 
Trademark Office collected less than eleven percent of its budget through 
post-grant fees.
266
 As a result, the Trademark Office is substantially less 
reliant upon granting trademark registrations for funding than the Patent 
Office is on allowing patents.
267
 Equally as important, the Trademark 
Office has always heard from a more balanced set of constituents than its 
patent counterpart. While the initial trademark prosecution process occurs 
ex parte—that is, no third party is present to argue that the trademark 
should not be registered—the Trademark Office has always possessed 
robust adjudicatory authority to hear challenges to this initial registration 
 
 
 263. Elhauge, supra note 262, at 67–68 (“[T]he same interest groups that have an organizational 
advantage in collecting resources to influence legislators and agencies generally also have an 
organizational advantage in collecting resources to influence the courts.”); Marc Galanter, Why the 
“Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–
104 (1974) (noting that repeat players have advantages over parties that utilize the judiciary less 
frequently).  
 264. The Patent and Trademark Office is funded almost entirely through user fees. Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990); U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-113, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FEES ARE NOT ALWAYS 
COMMENSURATE WITH THE COSTS OF SERVICES, at 3 (1997) (noting that “fees and costs tend to be 
more closely aligned in the trademark process [than in the patent process] because most income is 
received prior to the examination of the application”). My previous work has shown that the Patent 
Office’s historical fee structure likely biased the Patent Office towards issuing patents because the 
Agency garnered over half of its operating budget through fees it could collect only if it granted 
patents. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect Decisionmaking?: 
An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2013).  
 265. See PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2014, at 32–33, available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/ 
USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf. 
 266. See id. 
 267. See sources cited supra note 264. 
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decision.
268
 Thus, unlike the Patent Office, the Trademark Office has 
routinely interacted with constituents that are both for and against a broad 
scope for trademark law. This may have contributed to the Trademark 
Office’s seemingly greater appreciation that overly strong trademark 
protection will result in unduly restricting marketplace competition. That 
is, while the Patent and Trademark Office’s past rhetoric, including that its 
mission was “help[ing] customers get patents,” reveals a culture that 
appears to be unduly influenced by the interests of patentees,
269
 the 
Agency has made no such blatantly one-sided mission announcements 
with respect to trademarks.
270
 Even though the Trademark Office does not 
appear to show tendencies of overly favoring trademark protection, 
concerns about capture and institutional bias should be further studied.
271
 
The Patent Office has been the subject of more scrutiny than the 
Trademark Office, and thus it is possible that structures overly favoring 
the registration of trademarks exist but have not yet been revealed.
272
  
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that concerns over potential 
agency capture or bias represent a substantial objection to granting the 
Trademark Office more deference only to the extent that the judicial 
alternative is superior. The semi-specialization of the Federal Circuit has 
led some commentators to suggest that the appellate court has a pro-
intellectual property rights bent, although these charges have been 
 
 
 268. See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text; see also Wasserman, supra note 74, at 1975–
77 (noting that the Patent Office historically lacked robust authority to adjudicate already granted 
patents).  
 269. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Business, in CORPORATE PLAN-2001, at 23 (2001), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/corpplan/pt04.pdf. 
 270. Compare Patent Business, supra note 269, at 23, with U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
Trademark Business, in CORPORATE PLAN-2001 (2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/ 
offices/com/corpplan/pt05.pdf.  
 271. For instance, trademark examiners’ compensation system mirrors that of patent examiners. 
There was widespread agreement among scholars that the latter favored the granting of patents. See 
Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business 
Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 557, 607 (1999) (“Consequently, the 
only way to earn bonus points with confidence is to allow a patent application.”). Recent empirical 
work by Michael Frakes and myself that finds that as patent examiners are promoted, and receive less 
time to review patent applications, their grant rates increase dramatically, suggests that the incentives 
facing examiners are much more complicated than they were typically perceived. Michael D. Frakes & 
Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to 
Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data, REV. ECON. & STAT. 
(forthcoming 2016).  
 272. For instance, the Trademark Office has less attrition than the Patent Office. It is possible that 
this breeds a more insular culture that could be more subject to capture. I thank Saurabh Vishnubhakat 
for making this point.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1574 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1511 
 
 
 
 
primarily asserted with respect to patents, not trademarks.
273
 Nevertheless, 
the possibility that the Federal Circuit’s decision-making process is unduly 
influenced by factions, at the very least, gives pause to dismissing the 
concept of the Trademark Office playing a larger role in trademark policy 
based solely on the potential of agency capture.  
In sum, the Trademark Office possesses superior pathways to acquire 
consumer behavior and economic data, as well as the expertise to evaluate 
and analyze this information to craft substantive trademark law standards, 
to ultimately promote the normative goals of the trademark system. Even 
though neither the Federal Circuit nor the Trademark Office has 
historically shown strength in policy-making, the Trademark Office has 
recently made significant strides to correct this deficiency and at least 
could conceivably be restructured to perform this policy-making function. 
Moreover, although agencies in general are more likely to be captured by 
organized interests, the lack of charges suggesting the Trademark Office 
displays tendencies towards institutional bias suggests that this concern is 
not significant enough to outweigh the Trademark Office’s associated 
expertise benefits. Thus, this Subpart ultimately concludes that both 
expertise and the avoidance of capture support the Federal Circuit granting 
more deference to the Trademark Office’s decisions.  
CONCLUSION 
Administrative law has historically been treated as tangential, at best, 
to trademark law. The Supreme Court, however, made clear in 1999 that 
standard administrative law norms—including the APA—apply to the 
Patent and Trademark Office. This Article has argued that the Federal 
Circuit deference afforded to the Trademark Office’s decisions is 
doctrinally incorrect. A proper application of administrative law 
jurisprudence results in the Federal Circuit affording more deference to 
both the Trademark Office’s factual and legal determinations. While an 
application of the administrative law principles has substantial 
 
 
 273. Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1608 (2011) 
(“[T]he Federal Circuit has the disadvantage of having been structured from the beginning to meet the 
needs of patent interest groups.”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional 
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1099 (2003) (discussing the tunnel 
vision that may exist in the Federal Circuit); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: 
A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (“[J]udges . . . are susceptible to 
‘capture’ by the bar that regularly practices before them.”); Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for 
Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1971 (2009) (“Judges in specialized courts may 
come to identify a little too closely with the areas of law in which they specialize.”).  
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implications for the roles of trademark institutions, it also, as this Articles 
argues, produces a normatively desirable result. Elevating the role of the 
Trademark Office ushers the trademark system into the modern 
administrative era, which has long recognized the deficiencies associated 
with judge-driven policy.  
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